Ethics, part 5 | Page 7

a single cause.
Proof-. An emotion is only bad or hurtful, in so far as it hinders the
mind from being able to think (IV:xxvi., IV:xxvii.); therefore, an
emotion, whereby the mind is determined to the contemplation of
several things at once, is less hurtful than another equally powerful
emotion, which so engrosses the mind in the single contemplation of a

few objects or of one, that it is unable to think of anything else; this
was our first point. Again, as the mind's essence, in other words, its
power (III:vii.), consists solely in thought (II:xi.), the mind is less
passive in respect to an emotion, which causes it to think of several
things at once, than in regard to an equally strong emotion, which keeps
it engrossed in the contemplation of a few or of a single object: this was
our second point. Lastly, this emotion (III:xlviii.), in so far as it is
attributable to several causes, is less powerful in regard to each of them.
Q.E.D.
Prop.X. So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our
nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the
modifications of our body according to the intellectual order.
Proof.- The emotions, which are contrary to our nature, that is (IV:xxx.),
which are bad, are bad in so far as they impede the mind from
understanding (IV:xxvii.). So long, therefore, as we are not assailed by
emotions contrary to our nature, the mind's power, whereby it
endeavours to understand things (IV:xxvi.), is not impeded, and
therefore it is able to form clear and distinct ideas and to deduce them
one from another (II:xl.Note.ii. and II:xlvii.Note); consequently we
have in such cases the power of arranging and associating the
modifications of the body according to the intellectual order. Q.E.D.
Note.- By this power of rightly arranging and associating the bodily
modifications we can guard ourselves from being easily affected by
evil emotions. For (V:vii.) a greater force is needed for controlling the
emotions, when they are arranged and associated according to the
intellectual order, than when they, are uncertain and unsettled. The best
we can do, therefore, so long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge
of our emotions, is to frame a system of right conduct, or fixed
practical precepts, to commit it to memory, and to apply it forthwith to
the particular circumstances which now and again meet us in life, so
that our imagination may become fully imbued therewith, and that it
may be always ready to our hand. For instance, we have laid down
among the rules of life (IV:xlvi., & Note), that hatred should be
overcome with love or high- mindedness, and not required with hatred
in return. Now, that this precept of reason may be always ready to our
hand in time of need, we should often think over and reflect upon the
wrongs generally committed by men, and in what manner and way they

may be best warded off by high-mindedness: we shall thus associate
the idea of wrong with the idea of this precept, which accordingly will
always be ready for use when a wrong is done to us (II:xviii.). If we
keep also in readiness the notion of our true advantage, and of the good
which follows from mutual friendships, and common fellowships;
further, if we remember that complete acquiescence is the result of the
right way of life (IV:lii.), and that men, no less than everything else, act
by the necessity of their nature: in such case I say the wrong, or the
hatred, which commonly arises therefrom, will engross a very small
part of our imagination and will be easily overcome; or, if the anger
which springs from a grievous wrong be not overcome easily, it will
nevertheless be overcome, though not without a spiritual conflict, far
sooner than if we had not thus reflected on the subject beforehand. As
is indeed evident from V:vi.,V:vii.,V:viii. We should, in the same way,
reflect on courage as a means of overcoming fear; the ordinary dangers
of life should frequently be brought to mind and imagined, together
with the means whereby through readiness of resource and strength of
mind we can avoid and overcome them. But we must note, that in
arranging our thoughts and conceptions we should always bear in mind
that which is good in every individual thing (IV:lxiii.Coroll. and
III:lix.), in order that we may always be determined to action by an
emotion of pleasure. For instance, if a man sees that he is too keen in
the pursuit of honour, let him think over its right use, the end for which
it should be pursued, and the means whereby he may attain it. Let him
not think of its misuse, and its emptiness, and the fickleness of mankind,
and