Ethics, part 5 | Page 5

defined by the power of its cause, in so far
as its essence is explained or defined by the essence of its cause. (This
axiom is evident from III.vii.)

PROPOSITIONS.
Prop.I. Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and
associated in the mind, so are the modifications of body or the images
of things precisely in the same way arranged and associated in the
body.
Proof.- The order and connection of ideas is the same (II:vii.) as the
order and connection of things, and vice versa the order and connection
of things is the same (II:vi.Coroll. and II:vii.) as the order and
connection of ideas. Wherefore, even as the order and connection of
ideas in the mind takes place according to the order and association of
modifications of the body (II:xviii.), so vice versa (III:ii.) the order and
connection of modifications of the body takes place in accordance with
the manner, in which thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and
associated in the mind. Q.E.D.
PROP.II. If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion, from the
thought of an external cause, and unite it to other thoughts, then will
the love or hatred towards that external cause, and also the vacillations
of spirit which arise from these emotions, be destroyed.
Proof.- That, which constitutes the reality of love or hatred, is pleasure
or pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause (Def. of the
Emotions:vi.,&vii.); wherefore, when this cause is removed, the reality
of love or hatred is removed with it; therefore these emotions and those
which arise therefrom are destroyed. Q.E.D.
Prop.III. An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a passion, as
soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof.
Proof.- An emotion, which is a passion, is a confused idea (by the
general Def. of the Emotions). If, therefore, we form a clear and
distinct idea of a given emotion, that idea will only be distinguished
from the emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind only, by reason
(II:xxi.,&Note); therefore (III:iii.), the emotion will cease to be a
passion. Q.E.D.
Corollary.- An emotion therefore becomes more under our control, and
the mind is less passive in respect to it, in proportion as it is more
known to us.
Prop.IV. There is no modification of the body, whereof we cannot form
some clear and distinct conception.
Proof.- Properties which are common to all things can only be

conceived adequately (II:xxxviii.); therefore (II:xii.and Lemma. ii. after
II:xiii.) there is no modification of the body, whereof we cannot form
some clear and distinct conception. Q.E.D.
Corollary.- Hence it follows that there is no emotion, whereof we
cannot form some clear and distinct conception. For an emotion is the
idea of a modification of the body (by the general Def. of the
Emotions), and must therefore (by the preceding Prop.) involve some
clear and distinct conception.
Note.- Seeing that there is nothing which is not followed by an effect
(I:xxxvi.), and that we clearly and distinctly understand whatever
follows from an idea, which in us is adequate (II:xl.), it follows that
everyone has the power of clearly and distinctly understanding himself
and his emotions, if not absolutely, at any rate in part, and consequently
of bringing it about, that he should become less subject to them. To
attain this result, therefore, we must chiefly direct our efforts to
acquiring, as far as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of every
emotion, in order that the mind may thus, through emotion, be
determined to think of those things which it clearly and distinctly
perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces: and thus that the emotion
itself may be separated from the thought of an external cause, and may
be associated with true thoughts; whence it will come to pass, not only
that love, hatred, &c. will be destroyed (V:ii.), but also that the
appetites or desires, which are wont to arise from such emotion, will
become incapable of being excessive (IV:lxi.). For it must be especially
remarked, that the appetite through which a man is said to be active,
and that through which he is said to be passive is one and the same. For
instance, we have shown that human nature is so constituted, that
everyone desires his fellow-men to live after his own fashion
(III:xxxi.Note); in a man, who is not guided by reason, this appetite is a
passion which is called ambition, and does not greatly differ from pride;
whereas in a man, who lives by the dictates of reason, it is an activity
or virtue which is called piety (IV:xxxvii.Note.i. and second proof). In
like manner all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far as they
spring from inadequate ideas; the same results are