Ethics, part 5 | Page 4

motion of the aforesaid
gland seems to have been united by nature to one particular thought out
of the whole number of our thoughts from the very beginning of our
life, yet it can nevertheless become through habituation associated with
other thoughts; this he endeavours to prove in the Passions de l'ame, I.
50. He thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak, that it cannot,
under proper direction, acquire absolute power over its passions. For
passions as defined by him are "perceptions, or feelings, or
disturbances of the soul, which are referred to the soul as species, and
which (mark the expression) are produced, preserved, and strengthened
through some movement of the spirits." (Passion del l'ame,I.27.) But,
seeing that we can join any motion of the gland, or consequently of the
spirits, to any volition, the determination of the will depends entirely on
our own powers; if, therefore, we determine our will with sure and firm
decisions in the direction to which we wish our actions to tend, and
associate the motions of the passions which we wish to acquire with the
said decisions, we shall acquire an absolute dominion over our passions.
Such is the doctrine of this illustrious philosopher (in so far as I gather
it from his own words); it is one which, had it been less ingenious, I
could hardly believe to have proceeded from so great a man. Indeed, I
am lost in wonder, that a philosopher, who had stoutly asserted, that he
would draw no conclusions which do not follow from self-evident
premisses, and would affirm nothing which he did not clearly and
distinctly perceive, and who had so often taken to task the scholastics
for wishing to explain obscurities through occult qualities, could
maintain a hypothesis, beside which occult qualities are commonplace.
What does he understand, I ask, by the union of the mind and the body?
What clear and distinct conception has he got of thought in most
intimate union with a certain particle of extended matter? Truly I
should like him to explain this union through its proximate cause. What
clear and distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate
union with a certain particle of extended matter? What clear and

distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union with a
certain particle of extended matter? But he had so distinct a conception
of mind being distinct from body, that he could not assign any
particular cause of the union between the two, or of the mind itself, but
was obliged to have recourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is
to God. Further, I should much like to know, what degree of motion the
mind can impart to this pineal gland, and with what force can it hold it
suspended? For I am in ignorance, whether this gland can be agitated
more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the animal spirits,
and whether the motions of the passions, which we have closely united
with firm decisions, cannot be again disjoined therefrom by physical
causes; in which case it would follow that, although the mind firmly
intended to face a given danger, and had united to this decision the
motions of boldness, yet at the sight of the danger the gland might
become suspended in a way, which would preclude the mind thinking
of anything except running away. In truth, as there is no common
standard of volition and motion, so is there no comparison possible
between the powers of the mind and the power or strength of the body;
consequently the strength of one cannot in any wise be determined by
the strength of the other. We may also add, that there is no gland
discoverable in the midst of the brain, so placed that it can thus easily
be set in motion in so many ways, and also that all the nerves are not
prolonged so far as the cavities of the brain. Lastly, I omit all the
assertions which he makes concerning the will and its freedom,
inasmuch as I have abundantly proved that his premisses are false.
Therefore, since the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is
defined by the understanding only, we shall determine solely by the
knowledge of the mind the remedies against the emotions, which I
believe all have had experience of, but do not accurately observe or
distinctly see, and from the same basis we shall deduce all those
conclusions, which have regard to the mind's blessedness.
AXIOMS. I. If two contrary actions be started in the same subject, a
change must necessarily take place, either in both, or in one of the two,
and continue until they cease to be contrary.
II. The power of an effect is