Ethics, part 5 | Page 3

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Benedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS (Ethica Ordine Geometrico
Demonstrata)
Translated by R. H. M. Elwes

PART V: Of the Power of the Understanding, or of Human Freedom

PREFACE At length I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics,
which is concerned with the way leading to freedom. I shall therefore
treat therein of the power of the reason, showing how far the reason can
control the emotions, and what is the nature of Mental Freedom or
Blessedness; we shall then be able to see, how much more powerful the
wise man is than the ignorant. It is no part of my design to point out the
method and means whereby the understanding may be perfected, nor to

show the skill whereby the body may be so tended, as to be capable of
the due performance of its functions. The latter question lies in the
province of Medicine, the former in the province of Logic. Here,
therefore, I repeat, I shall treat only of the power of the mind, or of
reason; and I shall mainly show the extent and nature of its dominion
over the emotions, for their control and moderation. That we do not
possess absolute dominion over them, I have already shown. Yet the
Stoics have thought, that the emotions depended absolutely on our will,
and that we could absolutely govern them. But these philosophers were
compelled, by the protest of experience, not from their own principles,
to confess, that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and
moderate them: and this someone endeavoured to illustrate by the
example (if I remember rightly) of two dogs, the one a house-dog and
the other a hunting-dog. For by long training it could be brought about,
that the house-dog should become accustomed to hunt, and the
hunting-dog to cease from running after hares. To this opinion
Descartes not a little inclines. For he maintained, that the soul or mind
is specially united to a particular part of the brain, namely, to that part
called the pineal gland, by the aid of which the mind is enabled to feel
all the movements which are set going in the body, and also external
objects, and which the mind by a simple act of volition can put in
motion in various ways. He asserted, that this gland is so suspended in
the midst of the brain, that it could be moved by the slightest motion of
the animal spirits: further, that this gland is suspended in the midst of
the brain in as many different manners, as the animal spirits can
impinge thereon; and, again, that as many different marks are
impressed on the said gland, as there are different external objects
which impel the animal spirits towards it; whence it follows, that if the
will of the soul suspends the gland in a position, wherein it has already
been suspended once before by the animal spirits driven in one way or
another, the gland in its turn reacts on the said spirits, driving and
determining them to the condition wherein they were, when repulsed
before by a similar position of the gland. He further asserted, that every
act of mental volition is united in nature to a certain given motion of
the gland. For instance, whenever anyone desires to look at a remote
object, the act of volition causes the pupil of the eye to dilate, whereas,
if the person in question had only thought of the dilatation of the pupil,

the mere wish to dilate it would not have brought about the result,
inasmuch as the motion of the gland, which serves to impel the animal
spirits towards the optic nerve in a way which would dilate or contract
the pupil, is not associated in nature with the wish to dilate or contract
the pupil, but with the wish to look at remote or very near objects.
Lastly, he maintained that, although every