Ethics, part 2 | Page 6

number of straight lines intersect within it,
the rectangles formed by their segments will be equal to one another;
thus, infinite equal rectangles are contained in a circle. Yet none of
these rectangles can be said to exist, except in so far as the circle exists;
nor can the idea of any of these rectangles be said to exist, except in so
far as they are comprehended in the idea of the circle. Let us grant that,
from this infinite number of rectangles, two only exist. The ideas of
these two not only exist, in so far as they are contained in the idea of
the circle, but also as they involve the existence of those rectangles;
wherefore they are distinguished from the remaining ideas of the
remaining rectangles.
IX. The idea of an individual thing actually existing is caused by God,
not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected
by another idea of a thing actually existing, of which he is the cause, in
so far as he is affected by a third idea, and so on to infinity.
>>>>>Proof--The idea of an individual thing actually existing is an
individual mode of thinking, and is distinct from other modes (by the
Cor. and Note to Prop. viii. of this part); thus (by Prop. vi. of this part)
it is caused by God, in so far only as he is a thinking thing. But not (by
Prop. xxviii. of Part i.) in so far as he is a thing thinking absolutely,
only in so far as he is considered as affected by another mode of
thinking; and he is the cause of this latter, as being affected by a third,
and so on to infinity. Now, the order and connection of ideas is (by
Prop. vii. of this book) the same as the order and connection of causes.
Therefore of a given individual idea another individual idea, or God, in
so far as he is considered as modified by that idea, is the cause; and of
this second idea God is the cause, in so far as he is affected by another
idea, and so on to infinity. Q.E.D.
<<<< any idea, the knowledge thereof is in God, in so far only as he has the

idea of the object.
>>>>>Proof--Whatsoever takes place in the object of any idea, its idea
is in God (by Prop. iii. of this part), not in so far as he is infinite, but in
so far as he is considered as affected by another idea of an individual
thing (by the last Prop.); but (by Prop. vii. of this part) the order and
connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.
The knowledge, therefore, of that which takes place in any individual
object will be in God, in so far only as he has the idea of that object.
Q.E.D.
X. The being of substance does not appertain to the essence of man--in
other words, substance does not constitute the actual being (forma) of
man.
>>>>>Proof--The being of substance involves necessary existence
(Part i., Prop. vii.). If, therefore, the being of substance appertains to the
essence of man, substance being granted, man would necessarily be
granted also (II. Def. ii.), and, consequently, man would necessarily
exist, which is absurd (II. Ax. i.). Therefore &c. Q.E.D.
*****Note--This proposition may also be proved from I.v., in which it
is shown that there cannot be two substances of the same nature; for as
there may be many men, the being of substance is not that which
constitutes the actual being of man. Again, the proposition is evident
from the other properties of substance--namely, that substance is in its
nature infinite, immutable, indivisible, &c., as anyone may see for
himself.
<<<< constituted by certain modifications of the attributes of God. For (by
the last Prop.) the being of substance does not belong to the essence of
man. That essence therefore (by I. xv.) is something which is in God,
and which without God can neither be nor be conceived, whether it be a
modification (I. xxv. Cor.), or a mode which expresses God's nature in
a certain conditioned manner.
*****Note--Everyone must surely admit, that nothing can be or be
conceived without God. All men agree that God is the one and only
cause of all things, both of their essence and of their existence; that is,
God is not only the cause of things in respect to their being made
(secundum fieri), but also in respect to their being (secundum esse).
At the same time many assert, that that, without which a thing cannot

be nor be conceived, belongs to