Ethics, part 2 | Page 7

the essence of that thing; wherefore
they believe that either the nature of God appertains to the essence of
created things, or else that created things can be or be conceived
without God; or else, as is more probably the case, they hold
inconsistent doctrines. I think the cause for such confusion is mainly,
that they do not keep to the proper order of philosophic thinking. The
nature of God, which should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is
prior both in the order of knowledge and the order of nature, they have
taken to be last in the order of knowledge, and have put into the first
place what they call the objects of sensation; hence, while they are
considering natural phenomena, they give no attention at all to the
divine nature, and, when afterwards they apply their mind to the study
of the divine nature, they are quite unable to bear in mind the first
hypotheses, with which they have overlaid the knowledge of natural
phenomena, inasmuch as such hypotheses are no help towards
understanding the divine nature. So that it is hardly to be wondered at,
that these persons contradict themselves freely.
However, I pass over this point. My intention her was only to give a
reason for not saying, that that, without which a thing cannot be or be
conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing: individual things
cannot be or be conceived without God, yet God does not appertain to
their essence. I said that "I considered as belonging to the essence of a
thing that, which being given, the thing is necessarily given also, and
which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also; or that
without which the thing, and which itself without the thing can neither
be nor be conceived." (II. Def. ii.)
XI. The first element, which constitutes the actual being of the human
mind, is the idea of some particular thing actually existing.
>>>>>Proof--The essence of man (by the Cor. of the last Prop.) is
constituted by certain modes of the attributes of God, namely (by II. Ax.
ii.), by the modes of thinking, of all which (by II. Ax. iii.) the idea is
prior in nature, and, when the idea is given, the other modes (namely,
those of which the idea is prior in nature) must be in the same
individual (by the same Axiom). Therefore an idea is the first element
constituting the human mind. But not the idea of a non-existent thing,
for then (II. viii. Cor.) the idea itself cannot be said to exist; it must
therefore be the idea of something actually existing. But not of an

infinite thing. For an infinite thing (I. xxi., xxii.), must always
necessarily exist; this would (by II. Ax. i.) involve an absurdity.
Therefore the first element, which constitutes the actual being of the
human mind, is the idea of something actually existing. Q.E.D.
<<<< infinite intellect of God; thus when we say, that the human mind
perceives this or that, we make the assertion, that God has this or that
idea, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is displayed
through the nature of the human mind, or in so far as he constitutes the
essence of the human mind; and when we say that God has this or that
idea, not only in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind,
but also in so far as he, simultaneously with the human mind, has the
further idea of another thing, we assert that the human mind perceives a
thing in part or inadequately.
*****Note--Here, I doubt not, readers will come to a stand, and will
call to mind many things which will cause them to hesitate; I therefore
beg them to accompany me slowly, step by step, and not to pronounce
on my statements, till they have read to the end.
XII. Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea, which
constitutes the human mind, must be perceived by the human mind, or
there will necessarily be an idea in the human mind of the said
occurrence. That is, if the object of the idea constituting the human
mind be a body, nothing can take place in that body without being
perceived by the mind.
>>>>>Proof--Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of any idea, the
knowledge thereof is necessarily in God (II. ix. Cor.), in so far as he is
considered as affected by the idea of the said object, that is (II. xi.), in
so far as he constitutes the mind of anything. Therefore, whatsoever
takes place in the object constituting the idea of the human mind, the
knowledge thereof is necessarily