Ethics, part 2 | Page 5

which they are modes, and not in
so far as he is considered through any other attribute.
>>>>>Proof--Each attribute is conceived through itself, without any
other part (Part i., Prop. x.); wherefore the modes of each attribute
involve the conception of that attribute, but not of any other. Thus (Part
i., Ax. iv.) they are caused by God, only in so far as he is considered
through the attribute whose modes they are, and not in so far as he is
considered through any other. Q.E.D.
<<<< modes of thought, does not follow from the divine nature, because that
nature has prior knowledge of the things. Things represented in ideas
follow, and are derived from their particular attribute, in the same
manner, and with the same necessity as ideas follow (according to what
we have shown) from the attribute of thought.
VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and
connection of things.
>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from Part i., Ax. iv. For the
idea of everything that is caused depends on a knowledge of the cause,
whereof it is an effect.
<<<< realized power of action-- that is, whatsoever follows from the infinite
nature of God in the world of extension (formaliter), follows without
exception in the same order and connection from the idea of God in the
world of thought (objective).
*****Note--Before going any further, I wish to recall to mind what has
been pointed out above--namely, that whatsoever can be perceived by

the infinite intellect as constituting the essence of substance, belongs
altogether only to one substance: consequently, substance thinking and
substance extended are one and the same substance, comprehended
now through one attribute, now through the other. So, also, a mode of
extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, though
expressed in two ways. This truth seems to have been dimly recognized
by those Jews who maintained that God, God's intellect, and the things
understood by God are identical. For instance, a circle existing in
nature, and the idea of a circle existing, which is also in God, are one
and the same thing displayed through different attributes. Thus,
whether we conceive nature under the attribute of extension, or under
the attribute of thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find the
same order, or one and the same chain of causes--that is, the same
things following in either case.
I said that God is the cause of an idea--for instance, of the idea of a
circle,--in so far as he is a thinking thing; and of a circle, in so far as he
is an extended thing, simply because the actual being of the idea of a
circle can only be perceived as a proximate cause through another
mode of thinking, and that again through another, and so on to infinity;
so that, so long as we consider things as modes of thinking, we must
explain the order of the whole of nature, or the whole chain of causes,
through the attribute of thought only. And, in so far as we consider
things as modes of extension, we must explain the order of the whole of
nature through the attributes of extension only; and so on, in the case of
the other attributes. Wherefore of things as they are in themselves God
is really the cause, inasmuch as he consists of infinite attributes. I
cannot for the present explain my meaning more clearly.
VIII. The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do not exist, must
be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in the same way as the
formal essences of particular things or modes are contained in the
attributes of God.
>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from the last; it is understood
more clearly from the preceding note.
<<<< except in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of God, their
representations in thought or ideas do not exist, except in so far as the
infinite idea of God exists; and when the particular things are said to

exist, not only in so far as they are involved in the attributes of God,
but also in so far as they are said to continue, their ideas will also
involve existence, through which they are said to continue.
*****Note--If anyone desires an example to throw more light on this
question, I shall, I fear, not be able to give him any, which adequately
explains the thing of which I here speak, inasmuch as it is unique;
however, I will endeavour to illustrate it as far as possible. The nature
of a circle is such that if any