Ethics, part 2 | Page 4

an infinite number of things in an infinite number of
ways, is, necessarily, in respect of thinking, infinite. As, therefore, from
the consideration of thought alone, we conceive an infinite being,
thought is necessarily (Pt. i., Deff. iv. and vi.) one of the infinite
attributes of God, as we were desirous of showing.
II. Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing.
>>>>>Proof--The proof of this proposition is similar to that of the last.
III. In God there is necessarily the idea not only of his essence, but also
of all things which necessarily follow from his essence.
>>>>>Proof--God (by the first Prop. of this Part) can think an infinite
number of things in infinite ways, or (what is the same thing, by Prop.
xvi., Part i.) can form the idea of his essence, and of all things which
necessarily follow therefrom. Now all that is in the power of God
necessarily is (Pt. i., Prop. xxxv.). Therefore, such an idea as we are
considering necessarily is, and in God alone. Q.E.D. (Part i., Prop. xv.)
*****Note--The multitude understand by the power of God the free

will of God, and the right over all things that exist, which latter are
accordingly generally considered as contingent. For it is said that God
has the power to destroy all things, and to reduce them to nothing.
Further, the power of God is very often likened to the power of kings.
But this doctrine we have refuted (Pt. i., Prop. xxxii., Cors. i. and ii.),
and we have shown (Part i., Prop. xvi.) that God acts by the same
necessity, as that by which he understands himself; in other words, as it
follows from the necessity of the divine nature (as all admit), that God
understands himself, so also does it follow by the same necessity, that
God performs infinite acts in infinite ways. We further showed (Part i.,
Prop. xxxiv.), that God's power is identical with God's essence in action;
therefore it is as impossible for us to conceive God as not acting, as to
conceive him as non-existent. If we might pursue the subject further, I
could point out, that the power which is commonly attributed to God is
not only human (as showing that God is conceived by the multitude as
a man, or in the likeness of a man), but involves a negation of power.
However, I am unwilling to go over the same ground so often. I would
only beg the reader again and again, to turn over frequently in his mind
what I have said in Part i. from Prop. xvi. to the end. No one will be
able to follow my meaning, unless he is scrupulously careful not to
confound the power of God with the human power and right of kings.
IV. The idea of God, from which an infinite number of things follow in
infinite ways, can only be one.
>>>>>Proof--Infinite intellect comprehends nothing save the attributes
of God and his modifications (Part i., Prop. xxx.). Now God is one
(Part i., Prop. xiv., Cor.). Therefore the idea of God, wherefrom an
infinite number of things follow in infinite ways, can only be one.
Q.E.D.
V. The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only in so far as he
is considered as a thinking thing, not in so far as he is unfolded in any
other attribute; that is, the ideas both of the attributes of God and of
particular things do not own as their efficient cause their objects (ideata)
or the things perceived, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking
thing.
>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from Prop. iii. of this Part.
We there drew the conclusion, that God can form the idea of his
essence, and of all things which follow necessarily therefrom, solely

because he is a thinking thing, and not because he is the object of his
own idea. Wherefore the actual being of ideas owns for cause God, in
so far as he is a thinking thing. It may be differently proved as follows:
the actual being of ideas is (obviously) a mode of thought, that is (Part
i., Prop. xxv., Cor.) a mode which expresses in a certain manner the
nature of God, in so far as he is a thinking thing, and therefore (Part i.,
Prop. x.) involves the conception of no other attribute of God, and
consequently (by Part i., Ax. iv.) is not the effect of any attribute save
thought. Therefore the actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, in
so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, &c. Q.E.D.
VI. The modes of any given attribute are caused by God, in so far as he
is considered through the attribute of