Ethics, part 2 | Page 3

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Benedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS (Ethica Ordine Geometrico
Demonstrata)
Translated by R. H. M. Elwes

Part II: ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND

PREFACE I now pass on to explaining the results, which must
necessarily follow from the essence of God, or of the eternal and
infinite being; not, indeed, all of them (for we proved in Part i., Prop.

xvi., that an infinite number must follow in an infinite number of ways),
but only those which are able to lead us, as it were by the hand, to the
knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness.
DEFINITIONS I. By 'body' I mean a mode which expresses in a certain
determinate manner the essence of God, in so far as he is considered as
an extended thing. (See Pt. i., Prop. xxv. Cor.)
II. I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being
given, the thing is necessarily given also, and, which being removed,
the thing is necessarily removed also; in other words, that without
which the thing, and which itself without the thing, can neither be nor
be conceived.
III. By 'idea,' I mean the mental conception which is formed by the
mind as a thinking thing.
>>>>>Explanation--I say 'conception' rather than perception, because
the word perception seems to imply that the mind is passive in respect
to the object; whereas conception seems to express an activity of the
mind.
IV. By 'an adequate idea,' I mean an idea which, in so far as it is
considered in itself, without relation to the object, has all the properties
or intrinsic marks of a true idea.
>>>>>Explanation--I say 'intrinsic,' in order to exclude that mark
which is extrinsic, namely, the agreement between the idea and its
object (ideatum).
V. 'Duration' is the indefinite continuance of existing.
>>>>>Explanation--I say 'indefinite,' because it cannot be determined
through the existence itself of the existing thing, or by its efficient
cause, which necessarily gives the existence of the thing, but does not
take it away.
VI. 'Reality' and 'perfection' I use as synonymous terms.
VII. By 'particular things,' I mean things which are finite and have a
conditioned existence; but if several individual things concur in one
action, so as to be all simultaneously the effect of one cause, I consider
them all, so far, as one particular thing.
AXIOMS I. The essence of man does not involve necessary existence,
that is, it may, in the order of nature, come to pass that this or that man
does or does not exist.
II. Man thinks.

III. Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or any other of the passions,
do not take place, unless there be in the same individual an idea of the
thing loved, desired, &c. But the idea can exist without the presence of
any other mode of thinking.
IV. We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways.
V. We feel and perceive no particular things, save bodies and modes of
thought.
N.B. The Postulates are given after the conclusion of Prop. xiii.
PROPOSITIONS I. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking
thing.
>>>>>Proof--Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, are modes
which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the nature of God (Pt.
i., Prop. xxv., Cor.). God therefore possesses the attribute (Pt. i., Def. v.)
of which the concept is involved in all particular thoughts, which latter
are conceived thereby. Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite
attributes of God, which express God's eternal and infinite essence (Pt.
i., Def. vi.). In other words, God is a thinking thing. Q.E.D.
*****Note--This proposition is also evident from the fact, that we are
able to conceive an infinite thinking being. For, in proportion as a
thinking being is conceived as thinking more thoughts, so is it
conceived as containing more reality or perfection. Therefore a being,
which can think