Dios Rome, Vol. 4 | Page 6

Pompey at first, when they got control of affairs, refused
to become princes, and by this attitude escaped harm. Cinna, however,
and Strabo,[2] the second Marius, Sertorius, and Pompey himself at a
later date, through their desire for sovereignty perished miserably. It is
hard for this city which has been under a democracy for so many years

and rules so many human beings to be willing to be a slave to any one.
You have heard that the people banished Camillus when he used white
horses for his triumph: you have heard that they overthrew Scipio after
condemning him for some fraudulent procedure: you remember how
they behaved toward your father because they had some suspicion that
he wanted monarchy. Yet there have never been any better men than
these.
"Moreover, I do not advise you merely to relinquish dominion, but to
accomplish beforehand all that is advantageous for the public, and by
decrees and laws to settle definitely whatever business needs attention,
just as Sulla did. For even if some of his ordinances were subsequently
overthrown, yet the majority of them and the more important still hold
their ground. Do not say that even then some will indulge in factional
quarrels, or I may be tempted to say again that all the more the Romans
would not submit to a single ruler. If we were to review all the
calamities that might befall a nation, it would be most unreasonable for
us to fear dissensions which are the outgrowth of democracy rather then
the tyrannies which spring from monarchy. Regarding the terrible
nature of the latter I have not even undertaken to say a word. It has
been my wish not merely to inveigh against a proposition so capable of
censure, but to show you this,--that it is naturally such a régime that not
even the most excellent men....[3]
[-14-] "They cannot easily persuade by frank argument men who
possess less power, or succeed in their enterprises, because their
subjects are not in accord with them. Hence, if you have any care at all
of your country, for whom you have fought so many wars, for whom
you would gladly surrender your life, attune her to greater moderation
and order her affairs with that in view. For the privilege of doing and
saving precisely what one pleases becomes in the case of sensible
people, if you examine it, a cause of prosperity to all: but in the case of
the foolish, a cause of disaster. Therefore he who confers authority
upon such men is holding out a sword to a child and a madman; but he
who gives it to the prudent, besides performing other services,
preserves the objects of his liberality themselves, though they may be
unwilling. Therefore I ask you not to be deceived by regarding
fine-sounding names, but to look forward to the results that spring from
them, and so to put an end to the insolence of the populace, and to

impose the management of public affairs upon yourself and the most
excellent of the remainder of the community. Then the most prudent
may deliberate, those most qualified for generals become commanders,
and the strongest and most needy men serve as soldiers and draw pay.
In this way, all zealously discharging the duties appertaining to their
offices and paying without hesitation the debts they owe one another,
they will not be aware of their inferiority and lack of certain advantages
and will secure the real democracy and a safe sort of freedom. The
boasted "freedom" of the mob proves to be the most bitter servitude of
the best element and brings a common destruction upon both. The other,
which I advocate, honors responsible men everywhere and bestows
equal advantages upon all so far as they are worthy: thus it renders
prosperous all alike who possess it. [-15-] Do not think that I am
advising you to enslave the people and the senate and then play the
tyrant. This plan I should never dare to suggest nor you to execute. It
would, notwithstanding, be well and useful both for you and for the city
that you should yourself establish all proper laws with the approval of
the best men without any opposing talk or resistance on the part of the
masses, that you and your counselors should arrange the details of wars
according to your united wishes while all the rest straightway obey
orders, that the choice of officials should be in the power of the cabinet
to which you belong, and that the same men should also determine
honors and penalties. Then whatever pleases you after consulting the
Peers will be immediately a law, and wars against enemies may be
waged with secrecy and at an opportune time; those to whom a trust is
committed will be