Dios Rome, Vol. 4 | Page 5

who have large
possessions are obliged to spend largely: the crowd of body-guards is
gathered because of the crowd of conspirators: and the flatterers would
be more glad to destroy than to save any one. Consequently, in view of
these facts, no sensible man would desire to become supreme ruler.
[-11-] If the fact that such rulers can enrich and preserve others and
perform many other good deeds, and that, by Jupiter, they may also
outrage others and injure whomsoever they please leads any one to
think that tyranny is worth striving for, he is utterly mistaken. I need
not tell you that to live licentiously and to do evil is base and hazardous
and hated of both gods and men. You are not that sort of man, and it is
not for these reasons that you would choose to be sole ruler. I have
elected to speak now not of everything which one might accomplish
who handled affairs badly, but of what even the very best are
compelled to do and endure when they adopt the system. The other
point,--that one may bestow abundant favors,--is worthy of zeal, to be
sure: yet when this disposition is indulged in private capacity, it is
noble, august, glorious, and safe, whereas in monarchies it is first of all
not a sufficient offset to the other, more disagreeable matters, that any
one should choose monarchy for this especially when one is to grant to
others the benefit to be derived therefrom, and accept himself the
unpleasantness involved in the rest of the conduct of the office.
[-12-] "In the next place, the matter is not simple, as people think. No
one could render assistance enough to satisfy all who need help. Those
who think they ought to receive some gift from the sovereign are
practically all mankind, even though no favors can at once be seen to
be due them. Every one naturally has his own approbation and wishes
to enjoy some benefit from him who is able to give. But the presents
which can be given them,--I mean honors and offices, and sometimes
money,--can be counted quite easily as compared with so great a
multitude. This being so, more hatred would fall to the monarch's lot
from those who fail to get what they want than friendship from such as
obtain their desires. The latter take what they regard as due to them and
think there is no particular reason for being very thankful to the one

who gives it, since they are getting no more than they expected.
Moreover, they actually shrink from such behavior for fear they may
appear in the light of persons undeserving of generous treatment. The
others, who are disappointed of their hopes, are grieved for two causes.
First, they feel that they are robbed of what belongs to them, for by
nature all persons think that everything which they desire is their own:
second, they feel as if they were finding themselves guilty of some
wrong, if they show resignation at not obtaining what they expect. The
man who gives such great gifts rightly of course investigates before all
else each person's worth: some he honors, others he neglects. As a
result, then, of his judgment, some are filled with pride and others with
vexation by their own consciousness of its correctness. If any one were
to wish to guard against this outcome and distribute his presents
without system, he would fail utterly. The base, being honored contrary
to their deserts, would become worse; for they would decide either that
they were approved as being good or, if not so, that they were courted
as dangerous persons: the excellent, on attaining no higher place than
they, but held merely in equal honor with the base, would be more
indignant at their reduction to the latter's level than the others would
rejoice to be deemed valuable. Accordingly, they would give up the
practice of better principles and strive to emulate less worthy men.
Thus, even as a result of the very honors, those who bestow them
would reap no benefit and those who receive them would become
worse than before. So that this consideration, which would please some
persons most in the monarchical constitution, has been proved to be a
most difficult problem for you to deal with.
[-13-] "Reflecting on these facts and the rest which I mentioned a little
earlier, be prudent while you may, and restore to the people the arms,
the provinces, the offices, and the funds. If you do it at once and
voluntarily, you will be the most famous of men and the most secure.
But if you wait for some force to be applied, perhaps you might suffer
some disaster together with ill repute. Here is evidence. Marius, Sulla,
Metellus, and