Dios Rome, Vol. 4 | Page 7

appointed because of excellence and not by lot and
strife for office; the good will be honored without jealousy and the bad
punished without opposition. Thus what was done would be
accomplished in the best way, not referred to the public, nor talked over
openly, not committed to packed committees, nor endangered by
rivalry. We should reap the benefits of the blessings that belong to us
with enjoyment,[4] not entering upon dangerous wars nor impious civil
disputes. These two drawbacks are found in every democracy: the more
powerful, desiring first place and hiring the weaker men, turn
everything continually upside down. They have been most frequent in
our epoch and there is no other way save the one I propose that will put
a stop to them. The proof of my words is that we have been warring

abroad and fighting among ourselves for an inconceivably long time:
the cause is the multitude of men and the magnitude of the interests at
stake. The men are of all sorts in respect to both race and nature and
have the most diversified tempers and desires. The interests have
become so vast that it is very difficult to attempt to administer them.
[-16-] Witness to the truth of my words is borne by our past. While we
were but few, we had no important quarrel with our neighbors, got
along well with our government, and subjugated almost all of Italy. But
ever since we spread beyond the peninsula and crossed to many foreign
lands and islands, filling the whole sea and the whole earth with our
name and power, nothing good has been our lot. In the first place we
disputed in cliques at home and within our walls, and later we exported
this plague to the camps. Therefore our city, like a great merchantman
full of a crowd of every race borne without a pilot these many years
through rough water, rolls and shoots hither and thither because it is
without ballast. Do not, then, allow her to be longer exposed to the
tempest; for you see that she is waterlogged. And do not let her split
upon a reef[5]; for her timbers are rotten and will not be able to hold
out much longer. But since the gods have taken pity on this land and
have set you up as her arbiter and chief; do not betray your country.
Through you she has now revived a little: if you are faithful, she may
live with safety for ages to come.
[-17-] "That I do right to urge you to be sole ruler of the people I think
you have long ere this been persuaded. If so, then be ready and eager to
assume the leadership of the State, or rather, do not let it slip. For we
are not deliberating about taking something, but about not losing it and
about running hazards in addition. Who will spare you if you commit
matters to the people as they were, and to some other man, seeing that
there are great numbers whom you have injured, all of whom, or nearly
all, will lay claim to the sovereignty? No one of them will fail to wish
to punish you for what you have done, or will care to have you survive
as a rival. There is evidence of this in the case of Pompey, who, when
he withdrew from his supremacy, became the victim of scorn and of
plots: he found himself unable to win back his place, and so perished.
Also Cæsar your father, who did this very same thing, was slain for his
trouble. Marius and Sulla would certainly have endured a like fate, had
they not died too soon. Indeed, some say that Sulla anticipated this very

end by making away with himself. Many of the provisions of his
constitution, at any rate, began to be abolished while he was still alive.
You, too, must expect to find that many Lepiduses, Sertoriuses,
Brutuses, Cassiuses will arise against you.
[-18-] "Seeing these facts and reflecting on the other interests involved,
do not abandon yourself and your country, out of fear that you may
seem to some to be pursuing the office of set purpose. First of all, even
if any one does suspect it, the desire is not one repugnant to human
nature, and the danger from it is a noble danger. Second, is any one
unaware of the necessity under which you were led to take this action?
Hence, if there be any blame attached to it, one might most justly
censure your father's slayers therefor. For if they had not murdered him
in so unjust and pitiable a fashion, you would not have taken up arms,
would not have gathered your legions, would not have made a compact
with Antony and