CIA Machinations in Chile in 1970 | Page 3

military and did not put much stock in the
chances for effective action against Allende. The outgoing Chilean

president, Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei, had tried the patience of
many conservative army officers, and plotting had been rife within the
military during his tenure. [19] Mutinies and small revolts had become
a subject of concern, made more pressing by the revolt of the "Tacna"
tank regiment--ostensibly over soldiers' pay--in October 1969. During
the "Tacnazo" rebellion, several generals had fled the country or had
been removed from command after being accused of coup plotting,
among them Gen. Roberto Viaux, the alleged leader, who was forced
into retirement. [20]
After Allende's election, scheming continued. A CIA report of 26
September 1970 noted that a number of former Chilean army officers
were attempting to infiltrate leftist groups in the hopes of conducting
terrorist acts that would compel an anti-communist crackdown by Frei
and the Army. Others were working in primarily civilian rightist groups
that had the same aim. The CIA observed: "President Frei taking no
direct part in planning, but close supporters such as Perez [Zujovic]
said to be acting in his name." [21]
Was everyone plotting against Allende? Amb. Korry doubted it. The
Ambassador concurred that the Chilean military would need to act as a
whole if military intervention were to succeed; simultaneously,
however, he doubted that such coordinated action was possible. He
reported to Washington, a full month before the beginning of Track II:
"An attempt to rob Allende of his triumph by, say, a General Viaux,
who has a certain mystique within the army, would, in all likelihood,
fail in a post-congressional decision period and be almost impossible
post-inauguration . . . ." [22] By mentioning a specific name, Korry was
trying to exorcise the influence of this particular individual, at the
center of coup speculation, from the plans of many in Washington.
Within weeks of Allende's success at the polls, Korry sent a message to
the Under Secretary of State about coup plotting within the Chilean
Army. He outlined one particular plan unwittingly related by a young
Chilean officer to a CIA co-optee, and concluded by saying:
. . . less precise but equally lurid information has been reaching us
from many quarters and it usually proves to be nothing more than

wishful thinking. This report must be considered in the same vein . . . . I
would prefer that we ceased to check out all such reports and to be
totally surprised by whatever might develop in the armed forces. In the
present circumstances, it is a waste activity for all concerned. Hence I
am instructing [CIA station] to desist from the normal efforts to learn
of possible military moves. [23]
Ignorant of the Track II initiative, Korry warned both the in-country
CIA team and the State Department that to promote a coup with the
climate and personnel at hand was to court a failure as massive and
damaging to American interests as the Bay of Pigs. [24] This warning
was ignored in Washington. Korry soon was demanding "Washington
consultations, noting that all elements in the mission accept Allende's
presidency as assured." [25]
Launching Track II
The six weeks between Allende's election and his inauguration was not
a long time to begin with, and, given the need to ensure secrecy while
attempting to infiltrate operatives and promote a coup, it became
incredibly short. With almost no contacts at the beginning of the
operation and little knowledge of the key players, the CIA officers in
the field considered "Operation Fubelt," as Track II was officially titled,
to be a "crash endeavour." [26]
With the Ambassador's influence sidelined by the Presidential Directive,
the CIA's William Broe was now directing the planning against Allende.
Pressure for success came from Kissinger and the President. With time
short, CIA officers in Santiago went against their better judgment and
opened communications with retired Gen. Viaux, as well as two
serving officers, Gen. Camilo Valenzuela, who commanded the
Santiago Garrison, and Gen. Vicente Huerta, a senior officer in the
Carabinero. [27] These latter two did not have anything close to
definite plans and so for the time being were kept on the side.
Viaux took the spotlight. Though viewed by many as an unstable fool,
and though he was no longer in the military, a CIA assessment
concluded that he had "extensive support among non-coms and junior

officers." [28] Another memorandum pointed out that since the Chilean
military was led by a man who respected the constitutionality of the
Allende government, the servicemen lacked a serving general officer to
centralize the plotting and "look to Gen. Viaux for inspiration." [29] As
early as 23 September, the CIA was reporting that Viaux "was in touch
with active duty army officers who may or may not decide to move."
[30]