CIA Machinations in Chile in 1970 | Page 4

They noted, however, that as a retired officer, no plan by Viaux
could succeed without the help of the regular army.
With the false-flaggers now established and operating in Chile, and
with the secret assistance of the US defense attachŽ, the CIA in
Santiago set out to determine what real support Viaux had within the
army. The answer came back within a few days: "COS [Chief of
Station] met with [a false flag officer] who said he had talked with Gen.
Viaux, and as a consequence is convinced that Viaux has no military
support." [31] This was troubling to the CIA officers, who passed to
their headquarters the opinion that Viaux was not only dangerously
unstable, but likely to lead whatever forces he could muster into a
premature action that would do the anti-Allende forces more harm then
good. They decided to stop working with Viaux for the time being:
"Santiago station was advised to use whatever channel available to
persuade Viaux to hold off his action until a more opportune
moment . . . . Since a mini-coup (which is what Viaux is most likely to
produce) would be counterproductive to our objective [name deleted]
has been advised to do everything possible to prevent a Viaux move, at
least for the time being." [32]
Frustration Builds
The CIA in Chile turned its attention to Gen. Valenzuela. While his
plans were not solid, as a serving officer he was at least in a position to
command troops in a coordinated action, and he was deemed
psychologically stable. [33] Direct contact was arranged:
2. CIA agent] will see Genl Camilo Valenzuela, if possible, on [date
deleted] Oct and brief him along these lines [CIA agent] will take
opportunity to caution Valenzuela about precipitate moves by Genl
Viaux (of which Valenzuela possibly cognizant). 3. CIA false-flagger]

who briefed COS evening [date del] Oct, promised attempt to contact
Valenzuela [deleted] . . . will ask aforementioned to dissuade Viaux,
without RPT without promising Viaux USG support for any later move.
(FYI: [COS] relieved to learn [CIA asset] not goading on Viaux, which
[we] would view as height of folly). 4. Urge you do not convey
impression that STA has sure-fire method of halting, let alone
triggering coup attempts. [34]
The fourth paragraph of this message makes a point repeated often by
the CIA agents on the ground: They were not puppet masters, capable
of fully controlling the Chilean officers they contacted. The message
had already been passed that the United States favored military
intervention, but the Santiago CIA operatives did not want to bear
responsibility for unfortunate results should a coup be led by a man
such as Viaux:
If Viaux moves on his own and succeeds (which is a distinct possibility)
then we face the unpleasant prospect that Viaux's junta will be an
autocratic, nationalistic military government, which may not
necessarily be pro-US. Accordingly, Viaux should still be considered
only as an opportunity of last resort . . . A Viaux Government, though
preferable to Allende, would be a tragedy for Chile and for the free
world. A Viaux coup would only produce a massive bloodbath. [35]
A bloodbath led by an uncontrollable and mentally unstable officer was
not the aim of the mission, as the CIA understood it. In short, a
rightwing government was not attractive to the CIA or to the US
government, for it would ultimately be counter-productive. Associating
themselves with dictatorial and bloodthirsty regimes would do little to
forward American efforts for increased influence in the region.
The US personnel writing cables at the time did not assume that
thwarting Allende had to be violent. To the modern reader, "military
intervention" implies violence. In the case of Chile, however, what the
CIA officers were looking for was, in the first instance, not actually a
coup. Rather, they sought some type of parliamentary subterfuge,
where the military would declare a state of emergency and seize power
temporarily, justifying the dissolution of the government in order to

call new elections. Chileans called this a "white coup." [36] The
obstacle to this preferred outcome was "that army not as yet set to
move and that Schneider Doctrine still conditions its reflexes." [37]
Moreover, the United States was not going to run a coup for the
Chileans. On 6 October, Viaux approached the CIA and asked for
weapons to start an uprising--bizarrely, he wanted "paralyzing gas
grenades." [38] The CIA in Santiago "turned down the proposal
categorically," with the reason given that "[USG] would not provide
arms if the golpe (coup) were to be made contingent on a favorable [US]
reaction. [USG] insists that the decision to move must be a [Chilean]
decision." [39] This does not mean that a forceful coup was entirely out
of the minds of the CIA at this point,