CIA Machinations in Chile in 1970 | Page 2

and execution of the policy, because it believed that the CIA's
warnings of impending electoral defeat for Chile's centrist parties were
exaggerated. The CIA, for its part, thought that the State Department
did not have a clear understanding of Chilean politics and the nature of
the Eastern Bloc threat posed by a Marxist state in the Americas. Such
disagreements between the CIA and the State Department would be a
hallmark of American operations in Chile, and would continue until
Allende was overthrown in 1973.
As time went on, Track I expanded to encompass a wide range of
political, diplomatic, psychological, and economic policies, as well as
covert operations designed to bring about the conditions that would

encourage Chileans to stage a coup. The parallel secret approach of
Track II involved more direct efforts to prompt Chileans to stage an
immediate coup. Both paths aimed at the same policy objective--the
removal of Allende--but they differed in their approach, means, and
timing. On the day following the Oval Office meeting, William V. Broe,
chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division, circulated the first
internal memo related to the new Directive. It recapped the President's
orders, indicated that the Departments of State and Defense were to be
excluded from the planning (removing the US ambassador to Chile and
his defense attachŽ from the loop), and appointed the CIA's director of
covert operations, Thomas Karamessines, to head the project. [7] While
the removal of the other government agencies seems extreme, it was
viewed as necessary to the secrecy of the operation and was within the
President's authority with regard to covert activities. [8] The first Track
II situation report, issued on 17 September, confirmed that the
command structure for the Chile project had been established and that
units would "operate under the cover of the [deletion] 40 Committee
approval of 14 September for political action and the probing for
military possibilities to thwart Allende." [9]
The Presidential Directive had made it clear that the CIA was to do
what it needed to do to prevent an Allende administration. The precise
parameters of such action are not yet in the public domain. Helms later
commented to a Senate committee that he did not believe that
assassination was within the guidelines given to him by the President,
"and I had made that clear to my fellows." [10]
With marching orders from the White House, the CIA sent four
"false-flag" officers to Chile, starting on 27 September. [11] They were
to get in touch with Chilean military personnel, a task considered too
hot for locally based CIA personnel. [12] With the assistance of these
false-flag officers, the CIA made 21 contacts with officers in both the
military and the Carabineros (the Chilean national police) from 5 to 20
October 1970. When contacted, "Those Chileans who were inclined to
stage a coup were given assurances of strong support at the highest
levels of the US government . . . ." [13] According to available records,
the wisdom and legality of this action, questionable today, was not

disputed at the time.
The Chilean Military
Finding Chilean officers in favor of a coup was not an easy task. The
officers of the Chilean armed forces were largely drawn from the
middle class and, as such, were conservative and anti-Allende.
Nonetheless, as an institution, the military was strongly
"constitutionalist," a stand championed by Gen. RenŽ Schneider
Chereau, who had become the commander-in-chief of the Chilean
Armed Forces in October 1969. [14] Underscoring the apolitical nature
of the institution, the Chilean constitution describes the Army as a
"nondeliberative body." [15] In May 1970, during the election
campaign, Schneider had told the newspaper El Mercurio that the
Army would respect the constitutional process and make no move at
intervention. [16] Although this "Schneider Doctrine" of
non-intervention angered many in the staunchly conservative military
because of Allende's socialist platform, that anger did not necessarily
equate to readiness to take action. [17]
A sobering consideration was the possibility that a coup attempt could
trigger mass protests, street violence, or even civil war, given Allende's
strong base of support. To thwart such violence and secure a post-coup
government, incipient plotters assessed that the military would need to
act as a whole to rally behind the new leaders. Potential plotters who
were contacted by US operatives reported that their
commander-in-chief, Gen. Schneider, "will only agree to military
intervention if forced to do so." [18] They concluded, therefore, that
Schneider had to be convinced to join the pro-interventionist camp
soon. If he persisted in his constitutionalist stance, he would have to be
removed from his position, in order to allow the military to intervene
against the installation of an Allende government.
The Ambassador's Perspective
The US Ambassador, Edward Korry, was aware of a long history of
mini-plotting in the Chilean