CIA Machinations in Chile in 1970 | Page 6

. . a coup climate does not presently exist. [Karamessines] noted that the highly unpredictable Gen. Viaux is the only individual seemingly ready to attempt a coup and expressed the view that his chances of mounting a successful one were slight. . . . [Kissinger] observed that there presently appeared to be little the US can do to influence the Chilean situation one way or another. Those present concurred." [52] This was acted upon the same day, and a directive was issued to the CIA in Santiago to cut off plotting with Viaux:
It was decided by those present that the Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him against precipitate action. In essence our message was to state: 'We have reviewed your plans, and based on your information and ours, we come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce your capabilities for the future. Preserve your assets . . . the time will come when you with all your other friends can do something. You will continue to have our support.' [53]
Many commentators have pointed out that this message does not truly "turn off" the Viaux plotting or, as Kissinger has stated, end Track II plotting entirely. Subsequent messages, however, shed some light on this controversial issue. One particular piece of evidence is a memorandum Kissinger wrote to the President on 18 October 1970. This lengthy memorandum starts by stating: "It now appears certain that Allende will be elected president of Chile in the October 24 congressional run-off elections. He will be inaugurated November 3." [54] It is clear that Kissinger accepted the reality--that no coup could occur in time--briefed to him by Amb. Korry and many other individuals involved in Chile. The next step, Kissinger stated, was "the formulation of a specific strategy to deal with an Allende government." Further statements in the same memo indicate that this step should be taken because: "Our capacity to engineer Allende's overthrow quickly has been demonstrated to be sharply limited." [55] Having ordered the end to US involvement over the short term with the only individual actively plotting a coup, the executive took the next logical step of planning for a coherent policy toward an Allende government.
Best Laid Plans . . .
While the White House was developing a new strategy for Chile, Viaux was continuing to solidify his plans. By 14 October, the CIA had learned that the Viaux group had decided that the best way for them to trigger a coup was to kidnap Gen. Schneider and remove him from Chile. [56] This would convince the Chilean military that chaos was just around the corner and, therefore, they should prevent Allende from taking power. By assuming power themselves to quell the "chaos," they could open the way--under Chilean constitutional law--for new elections, which, it was assumed, Eduardo Frei would win. The kidnapping, the CIA learned, was set for 17 October "between 0200--0700." [57]
Coincident with the White House's decision to put Viaux on hold, a Chilean officer approached the United States requesting funds for a similar "kidnap Schneider" plan. Although it initially seemed possible that he was "fronting" for Viaux, the CIA concluded that he was not and decided to provide the individual with some funds to purchase weapons. [58] This was a last-ditch effort, and the Agency was told by another contact on the same day that "[Name deleted] believes that Viaux's attempt to kidnap Schneider will not be made and now sees no possibility for anything to happen prior 24 October. . . .[CIA agent] reminded [Chilean contact] that US stands ready to help with anything plotting elements may need." The contact replied with an honesty that may have been the best summary to date of the Chilean situation: "What we need," he said, "is not money but a general with b***s." [59]
The appropriately equipped general was not far away, as it turned out. A memorandum of 16 October noted that "coup rumblings within and outside the military have increased in recent days." [60] Gen. Valenzuela, still unsure of the necessity for a coup, arranged for a meeting with Gen. Schneider on the evening of 16 October to attempt to convince the commander-in-chief of the need for the military to intervene in the political process. The "meeting . . . turned out [to be a] complete fiasco." [61] The following night, Valenzuela, now finally convinced of the necessity of direct action, sent a representative to meet with the US defense attach? in a dark corner of Santiago. The contact requested three submachine-guns and tear-gas grenades. Despite puzzlement over the need for these items, CIA Headquarters authorized Santiago to fill the request--they were delivered at 0200 hours on 22 October. [62]
Officers in Washington were not fully aware of the