CIA Machinations in Chile in 1970 | Page 7

provenance of the Valenzuela plot. CIA Headquarters had several questions: a. What happened between morning 17 October and evening 17 October to change [deleted] from despondency to measured optimism? b. Who exactly is involved in coup attempt? [63]
As it turned out, the Valenzuela plot was almost the same as Viaux's plan, which had been disclosed to the CIA on 14 October. Schneider would be kidnapped when leaving a stag party the evening of the 19th. Once abducted, he would be flown to Argentina. Simultaneously, Frei would resign and leave the country. The cabinet would also resign, and a junta led by an unnamed general would dissolve the congress. The CIA learned that Valenzuela was at pains to state to his fellow plotters that the dissolution of the congress would be their only "unconstitutional act." [64] Gen. Viaux, although aware of the Valenzuela plot, was not involved, it turned out. And Viaux, himself, may even have been a target for arrest by the Carabinieros in the aftermath of a Valenzuela coup, since they planned to use the kidnapping to "justify a move against leftist and rightist extremists." [65]
The first attempt by the Valenzuela group to kidnap Schneider failed because his team "became nervous due to inexperience." [66] A second attempt on the following night also failed, and the CIA assured Valenzuela that "USG support for anti-Allende action continues." [67] Valenzuela, for his part, assured the Americans that the Chilean military was still set to move. While assurances were being traded, the CIA concluded that "since Valenzuela's group is apparently having considerable difficulty executing even the first step of its coup plan, the prospect for a coup succeeding or even occurring before 24 October now appears remote." [68] There would be no kidnapping, no coup.
Unexpected Turn
But, suddenly, events deviated from the anticipated script: Only five hours after the machine guns were delivered to the Valenzuela group on 22 October, armed men ambushed Gen. Schneider on his way to work. Drawing his sidearm, Schneider was shot by the attackers, who were part of Viaux's gang. He died on the operating table on 25 October. The shooting occurred just 48 hours before Allende was to be confirmed in a congressional vote.
After the shooting, there was confusion among the CIA officers in Santiago, as well as a degree of hope. They were not entirely sure who had launched the attack, and whether it was a kidnapping attempt or an assassination attempt. They hoped that the action was the beginning of a move against Allende, but there was no evidence that this was going to occur. [69]
No coup immediately followed the shooting. On the morning of 24 October, an intelligence summary produced at Langley stated: "Yesterday, Gen. Viaux informed some of his followers that a military coup would be attempted during the early hours of 24 October . . . [but] there has been thus far no indication that the conspirators intend to push on with their plans to overthrow the government." [70] The cable concluded: "It was agreed that given the short time span and the circumstances prevailing in Chile, a maximum effort has been achieved, and that now only Chileans themselves can manage a successful coup."
In Santiago, a state of emergency was imposed after the shooting. Viaux and his gang surrendered, fled, or were arrested. The military and the Carabineros were confined to barracks. Valenzuela was appointed "Jefe del Plaza for Law and Order," and one Gen. Prats filled the spot of the then still gravely injured Schneider. Allende's Unidad Popular (the communist front party) reacted immediately with public appeals to block any "counter-revolutionary" actions, and the resulting tension seemed to favor a coup. But the CIA still reported "Santiago is quiet." [71]
Whatever the intended outcome from the kidnapping/assassination, it ultimately increased the desire of the politicians and most of the military to ensure that the constitutional process was followed. Although Valenzuela was in a powerful position and could have taken over, the mood had changed so dramatically that he did not make a move. On Saturday, 24 October, Allende's election as president was duly confirmed by the Chilean congress--with 153 votes in favor and only 42 votes either against or abstaining. [72] Attempts to prevent Allende from taking power had failed.
Examining the American Role
Although a successful military move against Allende had been unlikely from the start, the death of Gen. Schneider guaranteed the collapse of American hopes. Clearly Schneider's murder was not in the interests of the American government. Could they have prevented it, and, if so, did they make any efforts to do so?
What the Americans did and did not know becomes clear in the message traffic immediately following the murder. A cable of 22 October relates intelligence to the effect that Viaux's gang had been told that their coup attempt was