CIA Machinations in Chile in 1970 | Page 5

Viaux's plans "to be totally inadequate." [41]
Another problem with Viaux was his high profile as an anti-communist agitator. Having already led one military revolt, he was under constant scrutiny by the state security apparatus, which made clandestine contact by the Americans dangerous. "It station's firm opinion that further contact with [name deleted] presents too great a risk potential and offers very little in return. Considering the way the [defense attach?]-Viaux relationship is unfolding we feel [attach?] contact not worth maintaining . . . as we approach the 24th of October [Viaux] will just be too hot to handle." [42] To make matters worse, the CIA knew that the Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) had agents infiltrated close to Viaux and his associates. It would be foolish of Washington to offer Viaux continued support if the PCCh would later be able to disclose American activities. [43] Viaux was a disaster waiting to happen and had to be kept at a distance.
While the CIA wanted to keep Viaux at arm's length, the pressure on Agency officers in Santiago to come up with a "solution" to the Allende problem was massive, as attested by many of the men who worked in and around the project. [44] The problem was that there was no viable candidate to take the lead. Viaux, clearly, was compulsive and uncontrollable, probably even anti-American. [45] Valenzuela and Huerta had no plans, no forces assembled, and were perhaps a bit scared of moving. But the White House (the "highest levels" [46] ) was demanding a solution, a military solution, and "all other considerations are secondary." [47] �� The Santiago CIA station sent back what can only be called a cynical reply. It is worth quoting at length:
1. Station has arrived at Viaux solution by process of elimination: a. Alto Mando (high command) solution cannot be achieved . . . b. [Frei Solution] cannot be achieved . . . c. Regimental commander solution: Station . . . lacks requisite leverage to pry loose most commanders from their instinctive obedience to Alto Mando directives . . . 2. What can Viaux accomplish under optimum conditions? He can split armed forces . . . fencesitters will watch tide of battle before engaging themselves on either side. Carnage would be considerable and prolonged, i.e., civil war. Under best of circumstances, armed forces will break up and create unpredictable situation . . . 5. Above not intended to be exhaustive enumeration of some of key factors that ought to have hearing on your final determination. You have asked us to provoke chaos in Chile. Thru Viaux solution we provide you with formula for chaos which unlikely to be bloodless. To dissimulate US involvement will clearly be impossible. Station [CIA] team, as you know, has given most serious consideration to all plans suggested by HQs counterparts. We conclude that none of them stand even a remote chance of achieving [USG] objective. Hence, Viaux gamble, despite high risk factors, may commend itself to you." [48]
In three pages, the CIA COS in Santiago made dramatically clear the problems he was facing in trying to carry out a near-impossible task. Constructing a coup in a country where no one was willing to start the action was possible, but not if the United States wanted its involvement to remain secret, and certainly not if it wanted the action to be bloodless. As far as the Santiago station was concerned, Viaux was a no-win on all counts. Some days later, Santiago sent another message to Langley: "Station would appreciate firm and realistic guidelines from headquarters on what objectives to pursue in further dealings with General Viaux." [49]
Reality Sinks In
Following this cable, CIA Headquarters initiated a series of study papers looking more deeply into the implications of supporting Viaux. The conclusions were not optimistic--one paper was titled "The Coup that Failed: The Effects on Allende and his Political Posture." [50] Reality was slowly sinking in at Langley and the White House:
In summary, there is little climate in Chile to encourage or sustain a military move at this time, but Gen. Viaux continues to try with his major problems apparently being: (a) a sure way of containing the high command, especially Gen. Schneider in the early hours of a coup attempt, and (b) a method of controlling the pro-Allende mobs which very probably would swarm through downtown Santiago in the event of a coup attempt. [51]
The bottom line was that a Viaux coup would almost certainly result in American embarrassment and a strengthening of Allende's position. Inputs from both the CIA COS in Santiago and Amb. Korry made it clear that "Viaux did not have more than one chance in twenty--perhaps less--to launch a successful coup." The point had been made, and the Track II staff, Kissinger included, came to the conclusion that ".