CIA Machinations in Chile in 1970 | Page 4

and operating in Chile, and with the secret assistance of the US defense attach?, the CIA in Santiago set out to determine what real support Viaux had within the army. The answer came back within a few days: "COS [Chief of Station] met with [a false flag officer] who said he had talked with Gen. Viaux, and as a consequence is convinced that Viaux has no military support." [31] This was troubling to the CIA officers, who passed to their headquarters the opinion that Viaux was not only dangerously unstable, but likely to lead whatever forces he could muster into a premature action that would do the anti-Allende forces more harm then good. They decided to stop working with Viaux for the time being: "Santiago station was advised to use whatever channel available to persuade Viaux to hold off his action until a more opportune moment . . . . Since a mini-coup (which is what Viaux is most likely to produce) would be counterproductive to our objective [name deleted] has been advised to do everything possible to prevent a Viaux move, at least for the time being." [32]
Frustration Builds
The CIA in Chile turned its attention to Gen. Valenzuela. While his plans were not solid, as a serving officer he was at least in a position to command troops in a coordinated action, and he was deemed psychologically stable. [33] Direct contact was arranged:
2. CIA agent] will see Genl Camilo Valenzuela, if possible, on [date deleted] Oct and brief him along these lines [CIA agent] will take opportunity to caution Valenzuela about precipitate moves by Genl Viaux (of which Valenzuela possibly cognizant). 3. CIA false-flagger] who briefed COS evening [date del] Oct, promised attempt to contact Valenzuela [deleted] . . . will ask aforementioned to dissuade Viaux, without RPT without promising Viaux USG support for any later move. (FYI: [COS] relieved to learn [CIA asset] not goading on Viaux, which [we] would view as height of folly). 4. Urge you do not convey impression that STA has sure-fire method of halting, let alone triggering coup attempts. [34]
The fourth paragraph of this message makes a point repeated often by the CIA agents on the ground: They were not puppet masters, capable of fully controlling the Chilean officers they contacted. The message had already been passed that the United States favored military intervention, but the Santiago CIA operatives did not want to bear responsibility for unfortunate results should a coup be led by a man such as Viaux:
If Viaux moves on his own and succeeds (which is a distinct possibility) then we face the unpleasant prospect that Viaux's junta will be an autocratic, nationalistic military government, which may not necessarily be pro-US. Accordingly, Viaux should still be considered only as an opportunity of last resort . . . A Viaux Government, though preferable to Allende, would be a tragedy for Chile and for the free world. A Viaux coup would only produce a massive bloodbath. [35]
A bloodbath led by an uncontrollable and mentally unstable officer was not the aim of the mission, as the CIA understood it. In short, a rightwing government was not attractive to the CIA or to the US government, for it would ultimately be counter-productive. Associating themselves with dictatorial and bloodthirsty regimes would do little to forward American efforts for increased influence in the region.
The US personnel writing cables at the time did not assume that thwarting Allende had to be violent. To the modern reader, "military intervention" implies violence. In the case of Chile, however, what the CIA officers were looking for was, in the first instance, not actually a coup. Rather, they sought some type of parliamentary subterfuge, where the military would declare a state of emergency and seize power temporarily, justifying the dissolution of the government in order to call new elections. Chileans called this a "white coup." [36] The obstacle to this preferred outcome was "that army not as yet set to move and that Schneider Doctrine still conditions its reflexes." [37]
Moreover, the United States was not going to run a coup for the Chileans. On 6 October, Viaux approached the CIA and asked for weapons to start an uprising--bizarrely, he wanted "paralyzing gas grenades." [38] The CIA in Santiago "turned down the proposal categorically," with the reason given that "[USG] would not provide arms if the golpe (coup) were to be made contingent on a favorable [US] reaction. [USG] insists that the decision to move must be a [Chilean] decision." [39] This does not mean that a forceful coup was entirely out of the minds of the CIA at this point, for there were routine exhortations on the "seriousness of USG intent to attempt deny [the] presidency to Allende." [40] The CIA wanted the Chileans to do it on their own, but found