CIA Machinations in Chile in 1970 | Page 3

Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei, had tried the patience of many conservative army officers, and plotting had been rife within the military during his tenure. [19] Mutinies and small revolts had become a subject of concern, made more pressing by the revolt of the "Tacna" tank regiment--ostensibly over soldiers' pay--in October 1969. During the "Tacnazo" rebellion, several generals had fled the country or had been removed from command after being accused of coup plotting, among them Gen. Roberto Viaux, the alleged leader, who was forced into retirement. [20]
After Allende's election, scheming continued. A CIA report of 26 September 1970 noted that a number of former Chilean army officers were attempting to infiltrate leftist groups in the hopes of conducting terrorist acts that would compel an anti-communist crackdown by Frei and the Army. Others were working in primarily civilian rightist groups that had the same aim. The CIA observed: "President Frei taking no direct part in planning, but close supporters such as Perez [Zujovic] said to be acting in his name." [21]
Was everyone plotting against Allende? Amb. Korry doubted it. The Ambassador concurred that the Chilean military would need to act as a whole if military intervention were to succeed; simultaneously, however, he doubted that such coordinated action was possible. He reported to Washington, a full month before the beginning of Track II: "An attempt to rob Allende of his triumph by, say, a General Viaux, who has a certain mystique within the army, would, in all likelihood, fail in a post-congressional decision period and be almost impossible post-inauguration . . . ." [22] By mentioning a specific name, Korry was trying to exorcise the influence of this particular individual, at the center of coup speculation, from the plans of many in Washington.
Within weeks of Allende's success at the polls, Korry sent a message to the Under Secretary of State about coup plotting within the Chilean Army. He outlined one particular plan unwittingly related by a young Chilean officer to a CIA co-optee, and concluded by saying:
. . . less precise but equally lurid information has been reaching us from many quarters and it usually proves to be nothing more than wishful thinking. This report must be considered in the same vein . . . . I would prefer that we ceased to check out all such reports and to be totally surprised by whatever might develop in the armed forces. In the present circumstances, it is a waste activity for all concerned. Hence I am instructing [CIA station] to desist from the normal efforts to learn of possible military moves. [23]
Ignorant of the Track II initiative, Korry warned both the in-country CIA team and the State Department that to promote a coup with the climate and personnel at hand was to court a failure as massive and damaging to American interests as the Bay of Pigs. [24] This warning was ignored in Washington. Korry soon was demanding "Washington consultations, noting that all elements in the mission accept Allende's presidency as assured." [25]
Launching Track II
The six weeks between Allende's election and his inauguration was not a long time to begin with, and, given the need to ensure secrecy while attempting to infiltrate operatives and promote a coup, it became incredibly short. With almost no contacts at the beginning of the operation and little knowledge of the key players, the CIA officers in the field considered "Operation Fubelt," as Track II was officially titled, to be a "crash endeavour." [26]
With the Ambassador's influence sidelined by the Presidential Directive, the CIA's William Broe was now directing the planning against Allende. Pressure for success came from Kissinger and the President. With time short, CIA officers in Santiago went against their better judgment and opened communications with retired Gen. Viaux, as well as two serving officers, Gen. Camilo Valenzuela, who commanded the Santiago Garrison, and Gen. Vicente Huerta, a senior officer in the Carabinero. [27] These latter two did not have anything close to definite plans and so for the time being were kept on the side.
Viaux took the spotlight. Though viewed by many as an unstable fool, and though he was no longer in the military, a CIA assessment concluded that he had "extensive support among non-coms and junior officers." [28] Another memorandum pointed out that since the Chilean military was led by a man who respected the constitutionality of the Allende government, the servicemen lacked a serving general officer to centralize the plotting and "look to Gen. Viaux for inspiration." [29] As early as 23 September, the CIA was reporting that Viaux "was in touch with active duty army officers who may or may not decide to move." [30] They noted, however, that as a retired officer, no plan by Viaux could succeed without the help of the regular army.
With the false-flaggers now established