CIA Machinations in Chile in 1970 | Page 2

impending electoral defeat for Chile's centrist parties were exaggerated. The CIA, for its part, thought that the State Department did not have a clear understanding of Chilean politics and the nature of the Eastern Bloc threat posed by a Marxist state in the Americas. Such disagreements between the CIA and the State Department would be a hallmark of American operations in Chile, and would continue until Allende was overthrown in 1973.
As time went on, Track I expanded to encompass a wide range of political, diplomatic, psychological, and economic policies, as well as covert operations designed to bring about the conditions that would encourage Chileans to stage a coup. The parallel secret approach of Track II involved more direct efforts to prompt Chileans to stage an immediate coup. Both paths aimed at the same policy objective--the removal of Allende--but they differed in their approach, means, and timing. On the day following the Oval Office meeting, William V. Broe, chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division, circulated the first internal memo related to the new Directive. It recapped the President's orders, indicated that the Departments of State and Defense were to be excluded from the planning (removing the US ambassador to Chile and his defense attach? from the loop), and appointed the CIA's director of covert operations, Thomas Karamessines, to head the project. [7] While the removal of the other government agencies seems extreme, it was viewed as necessary to the secrecy of the operation and was within the President's authority with regard to covert activities. [8] The first Track II situation report, issued on 17 September, confirmed that the command structure for the Chile project had been established and that units would "operate under the cover of the [deletion] 40 Committee approval of 14 September for political action and the probing for military possibilities to thwart Allende." [9]
The Presidential Directive had made it clear that the CIA was to do what it needed to do to prevent an Allende administration. The precise parameters of such action are not yet in the public domain. Helms later commented to a Senate committee that he did not believe that assassination was within the guidelines given to him by the President, "and I had made that clear to my fellows." [10]
With marching orders from the White House, the CIA sent four "false-flag" officers to Chile, starting on 27 September. [11] They were to get in touch with Chilean military personnel, a task considered too hot for locally based CIA personnel. [12] With the assistance of these false-flag officers, the CIA made 21 contacts with officers in both the military and the Carabineros (the Chilean national police) from 5 to 20 October 1970. When contacted, "Those Chileans who were inclined to stage a coup were given assurances of strong support at the highest levels of the US government . . . ." [13] According to available records, the wisdom and legality of this action, questionable today, was not disputed at the time.
The Chilean Military
Finding Chilean officers in favor of a coup was not an easy task. The officers of the Chilean armed forces were largely drawn from the middle class and, as such, were conservative and anti-Allende. Nonetheless, as an institution, the military was strongly "constitutionalist," a stand championed by Gen. Ren? Schneider Chereau, who had become the commander-in-chief of the Chilean Armed Forces in October 1969. [14] Underscoring the apolitical nature of the institution, the Chilean constitution describes the Army as a "nondeliberative body." [15] In May 1970, during the election campaign, Schneider had told the newspaper El Mercurio that the Army would respect the constitutional process and make no move at intervention. [16] Although this "Schneider Doctrine" of non-intervention angered many in the staunchly conservative military because of Allende's socialist platform, that anger did not necessarily equate to readiness to take action. [17]
A sobering consideration was the possibility that a coup attempt could trigger mass protests, street violence, or even civil war, given Allende's strong base of support. To thwart such violence and secure a post-coup government, incipient plotters assessed that the military would need to act as a whole to rally behind the new leaders. Potential plotters who were contacted by US operatives reported that their commander-in-chief, Gen. Schneider, "will only agree to military intervention if forced to do so." [18] They concluded, therefore, that Schneider had to be convinced to join the pro-interventionist camp soon. If he persisted in his constitutionalist stance, he would have to be removed from his position, in order to allow the military to intervene against the installation of an Allende government.
The Ambassador's Perspective
The US Ambassador, Edward Korry, was aware of a long history of mini-plotting in the Chilean military and did not put much stock in the chances for effective action against Allende. The outgoing Chilean president,