An Essay on the History of Civil Society, 8th edition | Page 7

this history, constitute the first subject of our attention;
and they require not only to be enumerated, but to be distinctly
considered.
The dispositions which tend to the preservation of the individual, while
they continue to operate in the manner of instinctive desires; are nearly
the same in man that they are in the other animals; but in him they are
sooner or later combined with reflection and foresight; they give rise to
his apprehensions on the subject of property, and make him acquainted
with that object of care which he calls his interest. Without the instincts
which teach the beaver and the squirrel, the ant and the bee, to make up
their little hoards for winter, at first improvident, and where no
immediate object of passion is near, addicted to sloth, he becomes, in
process of time, the great storemaster among animals. He finds in a
provision of wealth, which he is probably never to employ, an object of
his greatest solicitude, and the principal idol of his mind. He
apprehends a relation between his person and his property, which
renders what he calls his own in a manner a part of himself, a
constituent of his rank, his condition, and his character; in which,
independent of any real enjoyment, he may be fortunate or unhappy;
and, independent of any personal merit, he may be an object of
consideration or neglect; and in which he may be wounded and injured,
while his person is safe, and every want of his nature is completely

supplied.
In these apprehensions, while other passions only operate occasionally,
the interested find the object of their ordinary cares; their motive to the
practice of mechanic and commercial arts; their temptation to trespass
on the laws of justice; and, when extremely corrupted, the price of their
prostitutions, and the standard of their opinions on the subject of good
and of evil. Under this influence, they would enter, if not restrained by
the laws of civil society, on a scene of violence or meanness, which
would exhibit our species, by turns, under an aspect more terrible and
odious, or more vile and contemptible, than that of any animal which
inherits the earth.
Although the consideration of interest is founded on the experience of
animal wants and desires, its object is not to gratify any particular
appetite, but to secure the means of gratifying all; and it imposes
frequently a restraint on the very desires from which it arose, more
powerful and more severe than those of religion or duty. It arises from
the principles of self preservation in the human frame; but is a
corruption, or at least a partial result, of those principles, and is upon
many accounts very improperly termed _self-love_.
Love is an affection which carries the attention of the mind beyond
itself, and is the sense of a relation to some fellow creature as to its
object. Being a complacency and a continued satisfaction in this object,
it has, independent of any external event, and in the midst of
disappointment and sorrow, pleasures and triumphs unknown to those
who are guided by mere considerations of interest; in every change of
condition, it continues entirely distinct from the sentiments which we
feel on the subject of personal success or adversity. But as the care a
man entertains for his own interest, and the attention his affection
makes him pay to that of another, may have similar effects, the one on
his own fortune, the other on that of his friend, we confound the
principles from which he acts; we suppose that they are the same in
kind, only referred to different objects; and we not only misapply the
name of love, in conjunction with self, but, in a manner tending to
degrade our nature, we limit the aim of this supposed selfish affection
to the securing or accumulating the constituents of interest, of the
means of mere animal life.
It is somewhat remarkable, that notwithstanding men value themselves

so much on qualities of the mind, on parts, learning, and wit, on
courage, generosity, and honour, those men are still supposed to be in
the highest degree selfish or attentive to themselves, who are most
careful of animal life, and who are least mindful of rendering that life
an object worthy of care. It will be difficult, however, to tell why a
good understanding, a resolute and generous mind, should not, by
every man in his senses, be reckoned as much parts of himself, as either
his stomach or his palate, and much more than his estate or his dress.
The epicure, who consults his physician, how he may restore his relish
for food, and, by creating an appetite, renew his enjoyment, might at
least with an equal regard to himself, consult how he might strengthen
his