An Essay on the History of Civil Society, 8th edition | Page 6

only to those who
inhabit the great cities of Persia or India. Of other nations, unknown to
me, I do not speak."
Man may mistake the objects of his pursuit; he may misapply his
industry, and misplace his improvements: If, under a sense of such
possible errors, he would find a standard by which to judge of his own
proceedings, and arrive at the best state of his nature, he cannot find it
perhaps in the practice of any individual; or of any nation whatever; not
even in the sense of the majority, or the prevailing opinion of his kind.
He must look for it in the best conceptions of his understanding, in the
best movements of his heart; he must thence discover what is the
perfection and the happiness of which he is capable. He will find, on
the scrutiny, that the proper state of his nature, taken in this sense, is
not a condition from which mankind are for ever removed, but one to
which they may now attain; not prior to the exercise of their faculties,
but procured by their just application.
Of all the terms that we employ in treating of human affairs, those of
natural and unnatural are the least determinate in their meaning.

Opposed to affectation, frowardness, or any other defect of the temper
or character, the natural is an epithet of praise; but employed to specify
a conduct which proceeds from the nature of man, can serve to
distinguish nothing; for all the actions of men are equally the result of
their nature. At most, this language can only refer to the general and
prevailing sense or practice of mankind; and the purpose of every
important enquiry on this subject may be served by the use of a
language equally familiar and more precise. What is just, or unjust?
What is happy or wretched, in the manners of men? What, in their
various situations, is favourable or adverse to their amiable qualities?
are questions to which we may expect a satisfactory answer; and
whatever may have been the original state of our species, it is of more
importance to know the condition to which we ourselves should aspire,
than that which our ancestors may be supposed to have left.

SECTION II.
OF THE PRINCIPLES OF SELF PRESERVATION.
If in human nature there are qualities by which it is distinguished from
every other part of the animal creation, this nature itself is in different
climates and in different ages greatly diversified. The varieties merit
our attention, and the course of every stream into which this mighty
current divides, deserves to be followed to its source. It appears
necessary, however, that we attend to the universal qualities of our
nature, before we regard its varieties, or attempt to explain differences
consisting in the unequal possession or application of dispositions and
powers that are in some measure common to all mankind.
Man, like the other animals, has certain instinctive propensities, which;
prior to the perception of pleasure or pain, and prior to the experience
of what is pernicious or useful, lead him to perform many functions
which terminate in himself, or have a relation to his fellow creatures.
He has one set of dispositions which tend to his animal preservation,
and to the continuance of his race; another which lead to society, and
by inlisting him on the side of one tribe or community, frequently
engage him in war and contention with the rest of mankind. His powers
of discernment, or his intellectual faculties, which, under the
appellation of reason, are distinguished from the analogous
endowments of other animals, refer to the objects around him, either as

they are subjects of mere knowledge, or as they are subjects of
approbation or censure. He is formed not only to know, but likewise to
admire and to contemn; and these proceedings of his mind have a
principal reference to his own character, and to that of his fellow
creatures, as being the subjects on which he is chiefly concerned to
distinguish what is right from what is wrong. He enjoys his felicity
likewise on certain fixed and determinate conditions; and either as an
individual apart, or as a member of civil society, must take a particular
course, in order to reap the advantages of his nature. He is, withal, in a
very high degree susceptible of habits; and can, by forbearance or
exercise, so far weaken, confirm, or even diversify his talents, and his
dispositions, as to appear, in a great measure, the arbiter of his own
rank in nature, and the author of all the varieties which are exhibited in
the actual history of his species. The universal characteristics, in the
mean time, to which we have now referred, must, when we would treat
of any part of