An Essay on the History of Civil Society, 8th edition | Page 8

affection to a parent or a child, to his country or to mankind; and it
is probable that an appetite of this sort would prove a source of
enjoyment not less than the former.
By our supposed selfish maxims, notwithstanding, we generally
exclude from among the objects of our personal cares, many of the
happier and more respectable qualities of human nature. We consider
affection and courage as mere follies, that lead us to neglect, or expose
ourselves; we make wisdom consist in a regard to our interest; and
without explaining what interest means, we would have it understood
as the only reasonable motive of action with mankind. There is even a
system of philosophy founded upon tenets of this sort, and such is our
opinion of what men are likely to do upon selfish principles, that we
think it must have a tendency very dangerous to virtue. But the errors
of this system do not consist so much in general principles, as in their
particular applications; not so much in teaching men to regard
themselves, as in leading them to forget, that their happiest affections,
their candour, and their independence of mind, are in reality parts of
themselves. And the adversaries of this supposed selfish philosophy,
where it makes self-love the ruling passion with mankind, have had
reason to find fault, not so much with its general representations of
human nature, as with the obtrusion of a mere innovation in language
for a discovery in science.
When the vulgar speak of their different motives, they are satisfied with
ordinary names, which refer to known and obvious distinctions. Of this
kind are the terms benevolence and selfishness, by the first of which
they express their friendly affections, and by the second their interest.

The speculative are not always satisfied with this proceeding; they
would analyze, as well as enumerate the principles of nature; and the
chance is, that, merely to gain the appearance of something new,
without any prospect of real advantage, they will attempt to change the
application of words. In the case before us, they have actually found,
that benevolence is no more than a species of self-love; and would
oblige us, if possible, to look out for a new set of names, by which we
may distinguish the selfishness of the parent when he takes care of his
child, from his selfishness when he only takes care of himself. For,
according to this philosophy, as in both cases he only means to gratify a
desire of his own, he is in both cases equally selfish. The term
benevolent, in the mean time, is not employed to characterize persons
who have no desires of their own, but persons whose own desires
prompt them to procure the welfare of others. The fact is, that we
should need only a fresh supply of language, instead of that which by
this seeming discovery we should have lost, in order to make our
reasonings proceed as they formerly did. But it is certainly impossible
to live and to act with men, without employing different names to
distinguish the humane from the cruel, and the benevolent from the
selfish.
These terms have their equivalents in every tongue; they were invented
by men of no refinement, who only meant to express what they
distinctly perceived, or strongly felt. And if a man of speculation
should prove, that we are selfish in a sense of his own, it does not
follow that we are so in the sense of the vulgar; or, as ordinary men
would understand his conclusion, that we are condemned in every
instance to act on motives of interest, covetousness, pusillanimity, and
cowardice; for such is conceived to be the ordinary import of
selfishness in the character of man.
An affection or passion of any kind is sometimes said to give us an
interest in its object; and humanity itself gives an interest in the welfare
of mankind. This term interest, which commonly implies little more
than our property, is sometimes put for utility in general, and this for
happiness; insomuch, that, under these ambiguities, it is not surprising
we are still unable to determine, whether interest is the only motive of
human action, and the standard by which to distinguish our good from
our ill.

So much is said in this place, not from a desire to partake in any such
controversy, but merely to confine the meaning of the term interest to
its most common acceptation, and to intimate a design to employ it in
expressing those objects of care which refer to our external condition,
and the preservation of our animal nature. When taken in this sense, it
will not surely be thought to comprehend at once all the motives of
human conduct. If men be not allowed to have disinterested