A Treatise of Human Nature | Page 3

goes not well within. There is nothing which is not
the subject of debate, and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. The
most trivial question escapes not our controversy, and in the most momentous we are not
able to give any certain decision. Disputes are multiplied, as if every thing was uncertain;
and these disputes are managed with the greatest warmth, as if every thing was certain.
Amidst all this bustle it is not reason, which carries the prize, but eloquence; and no man
needs ever despair of gaining proselytes to the most extravagant hypothesis, who has art
enough to represent it in any favourable colours. The victory is not gained by the men at
arms, who manage the pike and the sword; but by the trumpeters, drummers, and
musicians of the army.
From hence in my opinion arises that common prejudice against metaphysical reasonings
of all kinds, even amongst those, who profess themselves scholars, and have a just value
for every other part of literature. By metaphysical reasonings, they do not understand
those on any particular branch of science, but every kind of argument, which is any way
abstruse, and requires some attention to be comprehended. We have so often lost our
labour in such researches, that we commonly reject them without hesitation, and resolve,
if we must for ever be a prey to errors and delusions, that they shall at least be natural and
entertaining. And indeed nothing but the most determined scepticism, along with a great
degree of indolence, can justify this aversion to metaphysics. For if truth be at all within
the reach of human capacity, it is certain it must lie very deep and abstruse: and to hope

we shall arrive at it without pains, while the greatest geniuses have failed with the utmost
pains, must certainly be esteemed sufficiently vain and presumptuous. I pretend to no
such advantage in the philosophy I am going to unfold, and would esteem it a strong
presumption against it, were it so very easy and obvious.
It is evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature: and that
however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage
or another. Even. Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in some
measure dependent on the science of MAN; since the lie under the cognizance of men,
and are judged of by their powers and faculties. It is impossible to tell what changes and
improvements we might make in these sciences were we thoroughly acquainted with the
extent and force of human understanding, and could explain the nature of the ideas we
employ, and of the operations we perform in our reasonings. And these improvements are
the more to be hoped for in natural religion, as it is not content with instructing us in the
nature of superior powers, but carries its views farther, to their disposition towards us,
and our duties towards them; and consequently we ourselves are not only the beings, that
reason, but also one of the objects, concerning which we reason.
If therefore the sciences of Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, have
such a dependence on the knowledge of man, what may be expected in the other sciences,
whose connexion with human nature is more close and intimate? The sole end of logic is
to explain the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our
ideas: morals and criticism regard our tastes and sentiments: and politics consider men as
united in society, and dependent on each other. In these four sciences of Logic, Morals,
Criticism, and Politics, is comprehended almost everything, which it can any way import
us to be acquainted with, or which can tend either to the improvement or ornament of the
human mind.
Here then is the only expedient, from which we can hope for success in our philosophical
researches, to leave the tedious lingering method, which we have hitherto followed, and
instead of taking now and then a castle or village on the frontier, to march up directly to
the capital or center of these sciences, to human nature itself; which being once masters
of, we may every where else hope for an easy victory. From this station we may extend
our conquests over all those sciences, which more intimately concern human life, and
may afterwards proceed at leisure to discover more fully those, which are the objects of
pore curiosity. There is no question of importance, whose decision is not comprised in the
science of man; and there is none, which can be decided with any certainty, before we
become acquainted with that science. In pretending, therefore, to explain the principles of
human nature, we in effect propose a