A Treatise of Human Nature | Page 2

IV OF THE RELATIONS OF IMPRESSIONS AND IDEAS
SECT. V OF THE INFLUENCE OF THESE RELATIONS ON PRIDE AND

HUMILITY SECT. VI LIMITATIONS OF THIS SYSTEM SECT. VII OF VICE AND
VIRTUE SECT. VIII OF BEAUTY AND DEFORMITY SECT. IX OF EXTERNAL
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES SECT. X OF PROPERTY AND RICHES
SECT. XI OF THE LOVE OF FAME SECT. XII OF THE PRIDE AND HUMILITY OF
ANIMALS



PART II OF LOVE AND HATRED
SECT. I OF THE OBJECT AND CAUSES OF LOVE AND HATRED SECT. II
EXPERIMENTS TO CONFIRM THIS SYSTEM SECT. III DIFFICULTIES SOLVED
SECT. IV OF THE LOVE OF RELATIONS SECT. V OF OUR ESTEEM FOR THE
RICH AND POWERFUL SECT. VI OF BENEVOLENCE AND ANGER SECT. VII OF
COMPASSION SECT. VIII OF MALICE AND ENVY SECT. IX OF THE MIXTURE
OF BENEVOLENCE AND ANGER WITH COMPASSION AND MALICE SECT. X
OF RESPECT AND CONTEMPT SECT. XI OF THE AMOROUS PASSION, OR
LOVE BETWIXT THE SEXES SECT. XII OF THE LOVE AND HATRED OF
ANIMALS



PART III OF THE WILL AND DIRECT PASSIONS
SECT. I OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY SECT. II THE SAME SUBJECT
CONTINUED SECT. III OF THE INFLUENCING MOTIVES OF THE WILL SECT.
IV OF THE CAUSES OF THE VIOLENT PASSIONS SECT. V OF THE EFFECTS OF
CUSTOM SECT. VI OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE IMAGINATION ON THE
PASSIONS SECT. VII OF CONTIGUITY AND DISTANCE IN SPACE AND TIME
SECT. VIII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED SECT. IX OF THE DIRECT
PASSIONS SECT. X OF CURIOSITY, OR THE LOVE OF TRUTH
BOOK III OF MORALS

PART I OF VIRTUE AND VICE IN GENERAL
SECT. I MORAL DISTINCTIONS NOT DERIVED FROM REASON SECT. II
MORAL DISTINCTIONS DERIVED FROM A MORAL SENSE



PART II OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE
SECT. I JUSTICE, WHETHER A NATURAL OR ARTIFICIAL VIRTUE? SECT. II OF
THE ORIGIN OF JUSTICE AND PROPERTY SECT. III OF THE RULES WHICH
DETERMINE PROPERTY SECT. IV OF THE TRANSFERENCE OF PROPERTY BY
CONSENT SECT. V OF THE OBLIGATION OF PROMISES SECT. VI SOME
FARTHER REFLECTIONS CONCERNING JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE SECT. VII
OF THE ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT SECT. VIII OF THE SOURCE OF
ALLEGIANCE SECT. IX OF THE MEASURES OF ALLEGIANCE SECT. X OF THE
OBJECTS OF ALLEGIANCE SECT. XI OF THE LAWS OF NATIONS SECT. XII OF
CHASTITY AND MODESTY



PART III OF THE OTHER VIRTUES AND VICES
SECT. I OF THE ORIGIN OF THE NATURAL VIRTUES AND VICES SECT. II OF
GREATNESS OF MIND SECT. III OF GOODNESS AND BENEVOLENCE SECT. IV
OF NATURAL ABILITIES SECT. V SOME FARTHER REFLECTIONS
CONCERNING THE NATURAL VIRTUES SECT. VI CONCLUSION OF THIS
BOOK
APPENDIX TO THE TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE

* * * * * * * * * *

VOL. I OF THE UNDERSTANDING.

ADVERTISEMENT.

My design in the present work is sufficiently explained in the Introduction. The reader
must only observe, that all the subjects I have there planned out to myself, are not treated
of in these two volumes. The subjects of the Understanding and Passions make a
compleat chain of reasoning by themselves; and I was willing to take advantage of this
natural division, in order to try the taste of the public. If I have the good fortune to meet
with success, I shall proceed to the examination of Morals, Politics, and Criticism; which
will compleat this Treatise of Human Nature. The approbation of the public I consider as
the greatest reward of my labours; but am determined to regard its judgment, whatever it
be, as my best instruction.

INTRODUCTION.

Nothing is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to discover anything new
to the world in philosophy and the sciences, than to insinuate the praises of their own
systems, by decrying all those, which have been advanced before them. And indeed were
they content with lamenting that ignorance, which we still lie under in the most important
questions, that can come before the tribunal of human reason, there are few, who have an
acquaintance with the sciences, that would not readily agree with them. It is easy for one
of judgment and learning, to perceive the weak foundation even of those systems, which
have obtained the greatest credit, and have carried their pretensions highest to accurate
and profound reasoning. Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely deduced from
them, want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the whole, these are every where
to be met with in the systems of the most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn
disgrace upon philosophy itself.
Nor is there required such profound knowledge to discover the present imperfect
condition of the sciences, but even the rabble without doors may, judge from the noise
and clamour, which they hear, that all