A Treatise of Human Nature | Page 4

compleat system of the sciences, built on a
foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any
security.
And as the science of man is the-only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only
solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and
observation. It is no astonishing reflection to consider, that the application of
experimental philosophy to moral subjects should come after that to natural at the
distance of above a whole century; since we find in fact, that there was about the same
interval betwixt the origins of these sciences; and that reckoning from THALES to
SOCRATES, the space of time is nearly equal to that betwixt, my Lord Bacon and some
late philosophers [Mr. Locke, my Lord Shaftesbury, Dr. Mandeville, Mr. Hutchinson, Dr.

Butler, etc.] in England, who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing, and
have engaged the attention, and excited the curiosity of the public. So true it is, that
however other nations may rival us in poetry, and excel us in some other agreeable arts,
the improvements in reason and philosophy can only be owing to a land of toleration and
of liberty.
Nor ought we to think, that this latter improvement in the science of man will do less
honour to our native country than the former in natural philosophy, but ought rather to
esteem it a greater glory, upon account of the greater importance of that science, as well
as the necessity it lay under of such a reformation. For to me it seems evident, that the
essence of the mind being equally unknown to us with that of external bodies, it must be
equally impossible to form any notion of its powers and qualities otherwise than from
careful and exact experiments, and the observation of those particular effects, which
result from its different circumstances and situations. And though we must endeavour to
render all our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the
utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest causes, it is still certain
we cannot go beyond experience; and any hypothesis, that pretends to discover the
ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous
and chimerical.
I do not think a philosopher, who would apply himself so earnestly to the explaining the
ultimate principles of the soul, would show himself a great master in that very science of
human nature, which he pretends to explain, or very knowing in what is naturally
satisfactory to the mind of man. For nothing is more certain, than that despair has almost
the same effect upon us with enjoyment, and that we are no sooner acquainted with the
impossibility of satisfying any desire, than the desire itself vanishes. When we see, that
we have arrived at the utmost extent of human reason, we sit down contented, though we
be perfectly satisfied in the main of our ignorance, and perceive that we can give no
reason for our most general and most refined principles, beside our experience of their
reality; which is the reason of the mere vulgar, and what it required no study at first to
have discovered for the most particular and most extraordinary phaenomenon. And as
this impossibility of making any farther progress is enough to satisfy the reader, so the
writer may derive a more delicate satisfaction from the free confession of his ignorance,
and from his prudence in avoiding that error, into which so many have fallen, of
imposing their conjectures and hypotheses on the world for the most certain principles.
When this mutual contentment and satisfaction can be obtained betwixt the master and
scholar, I know not what more we can require of our philosophy.
But if this impossibility of explaining ultimate principles should be esteemed a defect in
the science of man, I will venture to affirm, that it is a defect common to it with all the
sciences, and all the arts, in which we can employ ourselves, whether they be such as are
cultivated in the schools of the philosophers, or practised in the shops of the meanest
artizans. None of them can go beyond experience, or establish any principles which are
not founded on that authority. Moral philosophy has, indeed, this peculiar disadvantage,
which is not found in natural, that in collecting its experiments, it cannot make them
purposely, with premeditation, and after such a manner as to satisfy itself concerning
every particular difficulty which may be. When I am at a loss to know the effects of one
body upon another in any situation, I need only put them in that situation, and observe
what results from it. But should I endeavour to