With the British Army in The Holy Land | Page 8

El Arish. This retirement was
reported by the R.F.C. on the 20th December, and our mounted troops,
supported by infantry, were ordered to move on El Arish the same
night. The town was found to be evacuated. Aircraft reports showed
that about 1,600 of the enemy were on the march, in two columns, in
the neighbourhood of Maghdaba and Abu Aweigila, while Sheikh
Zowaid and Rafa appeared to be clear. The enemy were evidently not
retreating by the caravan route towards Gaza, but were falling back
southwards by the Wadi El Arish (the Biblical "River of Egypt") upon
their rail-head at Auja.
This evidence went to show that the garrison which had recently
evacuated El Arish were at Maghdaba, and it seemed likely that this
force were preparing to hold Maghdaba as a rearguard. A flying
column of cavalry was immediately despatched against them from El
Arish. This column found the enemy strongly posted and entrenched on
both banks of the Wadi El Arish. An attack was set in motion on the
morning of the 23rd December, and lasted for the greater part of the
day. By half-past four that afternoon, however, all organized resistance
was over, and the enemy were surrendering everywhere. No further
advance was attempted along the enemy's line of communications
towards Auja, and the troops, being but a flying column, retired at once
to El Arish.
Within a few days after the destruction at Maghdaba of the rearguard,
or garrison withdrawing from El Arish, another body of the enemy
started to entrench a position at Magruntein near Rafa. This was
obviously intended to bar our progress eastwards along the coastal
route, the old caravan route to Gaza. Rafa is the frontier town upon the
Turco-Egyptian frontier. The operation to which we are about to refer
was, therefore, the last engagement that took place upon Egyptian
territory. It was not possible at the end of December for the British
force to push on and occupy Rafa permanently, owing to difficulties of
supply. But since the enemy had again placed a small detached garrison
within striking distance of our mounted troops, the temptation was held
out for a repetition of the Maghdaba success at Magruntein.
Accordingly, a flying column, composed wholly of mounted troops and

artillery, moved out from El Arish on the evening of the 8th/9th
January, 1917. The enemy was taken completely by surprise, and by
dawn on the 9th January his position was almost entirely surrounded.
The position, however, was a formidable one, with ground in front
entirely open and devoid of cover. The main attack was timed for ten
o'clock a.m., and was delivered from the east and south-east. The town
of Rafa was soon occupied, and, in the course of the morning, our
attack against the Turkish system of defences developed on every side.
The enemy's works were dominated by a central redoubt or keep, and
orders were given for a concerted attack to be developed against this at
3.30 p.m. Meanwhile the enemy had despatched a relieving force from
Shellal, which is about twenty miles to the south-east of Rafa and
mid-way between that town and the nearest Turkish railway. This
relieving force was detected by our aircraft, who frequently attacked it
with bombs and machine gun fire. Orders were at once given for the
attack on the redoubt to be pressed with vigour, and, before five o'clock,
the redoubt was captured. With this position in our hands, the
remaining works soon fell, and by 5.30 p.m. all organized resistance
was over, and the enemy position, with all its garrison, was captured.
The relieving force were driven off without much difficulty, and
withdrew, presumably, to Shellal, which thereafter became the enemy's
next point of concentration. Our column, taking with them all prisoners,
animals and captured material, withdrew again to El Arish.
From the time of our occupation of El Arish on the 22nd December,
that town developed apace. Mine-sweeping operations were at once
commenced in the roadstead, a pier was erected, and, on the 24th, the
supply ships from Port Said began unloading stores and supplies. The
lie of the land gives unlimited opportunity to a power having the
command of the sea to supplement his other means of bringing forward
supplies by landing sea-borne goods upon the open beach. Repeatedly,
in the subsequent history of this war, we availed ourselves of this
means of supply, as our army moved northwards in Palestine. The
landing of stores at El Arish, however, was not wholly successful,
owing to the strong currents, a shelving and shifting beach, and heavy
surf. In winter, the sea is apt to be stormy here, and then such landing
may become impossible. Supplies were also hastened to El Arish by

camel convoy, and dumps were accumulated. The railway was pushed
on