With the British Army in The Holy Land | Page 7

from the Turkish railroad at Auja on the frontier, and advanced by way
of Maghdaba and the Wadi El Arish to El Arish, and thence westward
along the caravan route towards Egypt. This force had been well
equipped and trained for this class of warfare, and it succeeded in
dragging heavy guns across the desert byroads which it improvised for
the purpose. Making his advanced base at Bir-el-Abd, the enemy first
occupied and fortified a line about Mageiba. On the morning of the 3rd
August, he made a general advance, and took up a line fronting our
position at Romani. Here our left flank rested on the sea; the left of the
line was held by the 52nd Division, while the 53rd Division was on the
right. The East Lancashire Division was in reserve. The right flank
comprised a chain of posts, behind which were a force of cavalry. The
weak point was, therefore, our right flank, for a little force working
round by the south would threaten our communications and might
possibly cut us off from our reinforcements down the line and from our
base at Kantara. Accordingly, on the night of the 3rd/4th, one Light
Horse Brigade moved out to hold a three-miles line from our infantry
post on the right, sending out patrols a considerable distance in front.
About midnight, the enemy were found to be advancing in this
direction. Before light next morning this Brigade were heavily engaged,
holding up the advance of a considerable body of the enemy. Gradually
the Brigade were pressed back by weight of numbers, until, at about
five o'clock in the morning, the timely arrival of reinforcements
secured the complete arrest of the enemy advance in this direction.
Soon after daylight the enemy swung round his left flank and
established himself upon Mount Royston. This enforced upon us a
further retirement; but he had reached the limit of his success. Towards
the sea, the enemy attacks against the 52nd Division were beaten off,
and here he could make no progress. At about 5.30 in the afternoon, a
counter-attack was launched against Mount Royston, and this position
was recaptured. Early on the following morning, the 5th, before
daylight, the 52nd Division recaptured Wellington Ridge, the last of
our lost positions remaining in the hands of the Turk. The tide had now

turned definitely in our favour and the Turk was in full retreat. An
attempt was made to encircle his southern flank and to cut him off with
our cavalry, but his rearguard actions were fought stubbornly, and the
pursuing cavalry had to be withdrawn. During the night of the 5th/6th,
the enemy evacuated Katia, which was occupied by us on the following
morning. By the 8th, he had abandoned Oghratina, and had fallen back
to his advanced base at Bir-el-Abd. From this base he now proceeded to
evacuate camps and stores, but he was not allowed to do so unmolested.
He was followed up by the whole of our cavalry and effectually shelled
by our horse artillery. On the afternoon and evening of this day (the 8th)
the Turk counter-attacked our cavalry, who were clearly outnumbered.
Nevertheless the Turk considered it more prudent to burn the remainder
of his stores. He completed the evacuation of Abd by the 12th, and it
remained in our hands from this time forward. This abortive advance
against Romani marked the last determined attempt of the Turks to
invade the Suez Canal and Egypt. Henceforth the efforts of the Turks
were confined to opposing the storm which their misguided cupidity
had raised up against them.
After the battle of Romani, our mounted troops held a line about Abd.
The enemy now consolidated a position at Mazar, a little more than 20
miles further to the east. In the middle of September, a cavalry column
moved out to Mazar and attacked the Turkish positions. Neither side
was anxious to bring on a general engagement at that time. However,
the losses which the Turk suffered in this operation caused him
sufficient uneasiness to induce him to withdraw altogether from Mazar.
He therefore withdrew his troops to a position close to El Arish.
The Turkish garrison at El Arish consisted of some 1,600 infantry in all,
in a strong entrenched position. In the second week of December
increased activity was shown by the Turks, and aerial reconnaissance of
their camps behind their front line showed evidence of the proximity of
reinforcements. Our preparations for a forward move were pressed on
strenuously, and, though they were somewhat delayed through lack of
water, we were ready to move by the 20th December. The enemy
realized that the swiftness of our final preparations had been too much
for him. Knowing that his reinforcements could not arrive in time, he

hurriedly withdrew his troops from