What Germany Thinks | Page 9

mobilize. Finally, nobody could assert that the man (Sir Edward Grey)
who would have presided over these negotiations, could have been
impartial. The more one thinks about this mediation proposal the more
clearly one recognizes that it would have made for a diplomatic victory
of the Triple Entente."[7]
[Footnote 7: Professor Hermann Oncken: "Deutschland und der

Weltkrieg," pp. 545-6.]
Even the claim that Austria showed some inclination to permit
mediation on the points in her ultimatum to Serbia which were
incompatible with Serbia's sovereignty, has been categorically denied.
The Vienna Fremdenblatt for September 24th, 1914, contains this
official announcement:
"Vienna, September 24th. In a report of the late British Ambassador
published by the British Government, there is a passage which
maintains that Austria-Hungary's Ambassador, Count Szapary, in St.
Petersburg had informed Monsieur Sasonow, Russia's Minister for
Foreign Affairs, that Austria-Hungary 'was willing to submit the points
in her Note to Serbia which seemed incompatible with Serbian
independence, to mediation.'
"We have been informed officially that this statement is absolutely
untrue; according to the nature of the step taken by the monarchy in
Belgrade, it would have been absolutely unthinkable. The passage cited
from the British Ambassador's report, as well as some other phrases in
the same, are evidently inspired by a certain bias. They are intended to
prove, by asserting that Austria-Hungary was prepared to yield on some
points at issue, that German diplomacy was really responsible for the
outbreak of war.
"Such attempts cannot obscure the truth, that Austria-Hungary and
Germany concurred in the wish to preserve European peace. If this
wish has not been fulfilled, and a European conflict has arisen out of a
local settlement, it can only be ascribed to the circumstance that Russia
first threatened Austria-Hungary and then Germany by an unjustifiable
mobilization. By this she forced war upon the Central Powers and thus
kindled a general conflagration."
In dealing with Germany's endeavours for peace Professor Oncken
writes on p. 546 of "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg" ("Germany and
the World War"): "The work of German diplomacy took the form of
giving warnings and peaceful explanations." On July 26th she pointed
out to the Russian Government that "preparatory military measures on

Russia's part would compel Germany to take corresponding steps, viz.,
the mobilization of the army. Mobilization means war." Oncken does
not quote any of the "peaceful explanations" (_friedliche Erklärungen_),
and much as the present writer would like to fill up this gap in his work,
he must admit his utter inability, because in the diplomatic
correspondence he can only find exasperating threats, thrown out to
Russia by the two Germanic Empires.
The whole problem allows of a very simple digest: On July 23rd,
Austria-Hungary handed her ultimatum to Serbia, therein stating her
demands, and on the following day informed all the European powers
of her attitude. The neutral Press of the world and an unusually large
section of the German Press, immediately pronounced Austria's
position to be indefensible and untenable. The German Government, in
spite of these facts, gave its official and unreserved support to Austria's
attitude on July 26th. After eight weeks of war (on September 25th),
Austria officially declared that she had never swerved from her original
claims, nor ever felt any inclination to do so.
It is true that the usages of everyday life do not always hold good in
diplomatic dealings, but it is instructive to state the case in the terms of
everyday affairs. Mr. A. (Austria) informs Mr. B. (Serbia) that he has a
quarrel to settle with him and states his demands. Mr. C. (Russia) who
is a relation, patron and friend of B.'s, interferes to see fair play.
Whereupon Mr. D. (Germany), a friend and relation of A.'s, informs C.
in unmistakable fashion that he must neither speak nor act in the affair
or he will be immediately thrashed. Messrs. A. and D. are unanimous in
this view and repeat the threat in mutual form. Meanwhile A. attacks B.
Mr. C, seeing that they will not accord him a hearing, takes steps to
compel them to hear him, at which point Mr. D. fulfils his threat and
falls upon C.
It is not yet clear whether Austria would have permitted Russia to take
over the rôle of adviser and second to Serbia in her unequal struggle
with Austria. But from the moment Germany appeared on the scene the
situation becomes perfectly simple: Russia has absolutely no right
either to speak or move in the matter. On this rock of immovable

Germanic obstinacy the Russian ship of State, was intended to meet
with diplomatic shipwreck. Should Russia attempt to avoid this fate,
then the German sword could be trusted to arrange matters in the way
desired by Germany.
The German language contains a very expressive phrase,
Stimmungsmacherei, which means creating or