What Germany Thinks | Page 8

White Book; Austria's Orange Book), and can find no
record in them of any pacific action on Germany's part in either of the
European capitals; hence the claims made in the above article seem to
be an exaggeration.
It appears incredible that these Powers should have omitted to give
proof of such action when making their case public for the sole purpose
of proving their innocence before the world. On the other hand, the
impression given by these books is that Germany and Austria's attitude
was:
To SERBIA: The conditions must be accepted ad hoc to the smallest
tittle and comma. Alternative, war.
To RUSSIA: What we have determined upon is unalterable and
inevitable, and you must submit to this decision. Alternative, war.
The _Görlitzer Nachrichten_ published the following paragraph on July
30th: "Vienna, July 29th. After having made inquiries in official circles,
the morning papers make this announcement: Count Berchtold has
informed the English Ambassador that the Austro-Hungarian
Government is grateful for Grey's mediation proposal, and appreciates

the good intentions of the British Government. A peaceful solution of
the conflict with Serbia is, however, no longer possible, as the
declaration of war had already been signed."
Before leaving this all-important episode, it is instructive to compare
three other versions of the reason for refusing a conference. Sir Edward
Grey mooted the proposal for a conference to the ambassadors in
London on Friday, July 24th. On the afternoon he requested the British
Ambassador in Berlin to propose the conference to the German
Government.
In spite of this, document No. 12 in the German White Book, a
telegram from the German Chancellor to Prince Lichnowsky in London
runs: "We know nothing here of a proposal from Sir Edward Grey to
hold a conference of four in London, etc." Another telegram, document
No. 15, bearing the same date and likewise from Bethmann-Hollweg to
Lichnowsky is as follows: "We have immediately commenced the
mediatory action in Vienna in the sense desired by Sir Edward Grey.
Furthermore, we have informed Count Berchtold of M. Sasonow's
desire to communicate with him direct."[6]
[Footnote 6: This message leads to the assumption that direct
communications between Vienna and Petrograd had already ceased,
although the _Kölnische Zeitung_ told the German public on the
following day that they had not.]
The next document in the German White Book is dated July 28th. It is
a telegram from the German Ambassador in Vienna to the German
Chancellor in Berlin. "Count Berchtold begs me to express his thanks
to you for communicating the English mediation proposal. He replies,
however, that in consequence of the commencement of hostilities by
Serbia and after the declaration of war which has meanwhile been made
he must look upon England's step as being too late."
In the Austrian Orange Book, p. 122, we find this passage in a telegram
from Count Berchtold to the Austrian representative in London: "When
Sir Edward Grey speaks of the possibility of avoiding an outbreak of
hostilities he is too late, for yesterday Serbians shot at our frontier

guards, and to-day we have declared war on Serbia."
There are two points in these telegrams which require explanation.
Firstly, why should Sir Edward Grey's proposal take so long to reach
Vienna. Apparently it took from Monday to Wednesday to go by
telegram from London via Berlin to Vienna. Two German newspapers
(already quoted) knew of this conference idea on the 27th of July and
commented upon it in their morning editions of the following day.
The other point is the Austrian statement that Serbia commenced
hostilities. If this were the case, one would expect that Austria-Hungary,
in declaring war subsequently to the alleged shooting by Serbians at
frontier guards, would make mention of the acts as a casus belli. On p.
117 of the Red Book the text of the declaration of war is given in full,
but there is no mention of any resort to arms on the part of Serbia.
We are forced to the conclusion that Germany and Austria are mutually
responsible for preventing the conference; they desired war, and a
conference might have preserved peace. During the present summer
(1915) an important work has been published in Germany from which
the following passage is taken:
"Grey thought the time had now arrived to formulate a mediation
proposal. This idea was from the very beginning unacceptable to
Austria, because that would indirectly be a recognition of Russia as an
interested Power in the Austro-Serbian conflict. Only those who have
followed the development of mutual obligations between the Entente
Powers are able to understand the role which Russia's two comrades
(France and England)--to say nothing at all of Italy--would have played
in this conference. During its sittings Russia would have continued her
military preparations, while Germany would have been pledged not to