The Olynthiacs and the Phillippics of Demothenes | Page 5

And
surely we must suppose, that Paeonians and Illyrians, and all such
people, would rather be free and independent than under subjection; for
they are unused to obedience, and the man is a tyrant. So report says,
and I can well believe it; for undeserved success leads weak-minded
men into folly; and thus it appears often, that to maintain prosperity is
harder than to acquire it. Therefore must you, Athenians, looking on his
difficulty as your opportunity, assist cheerfully in the war, sending
embassies where required, taking arms yourselves, exciting all other
people; for if Philip got such an opportunity against us, and there was a
war on our frontier, how eagerly think ye he would attack you! Then
are you not ashamed, that the very damage which you would suffer, if

he had the power, you dare not seize the moment to inflict on him?
And let not this escape you, Athenians, that you have now the choice,
whether you shall fight there, or he in your country. If Olynthus hold
out, you will fight there and distress his dominions, enjoying your own
home in peace. If Philip take that city, who shall then prevent his
marching here? Thebans? I wish it be not too harsh to say, they will be
ready to join in the invasion. Phocians? who can not defend their own
country without your assistance. Or some other ally? But, good sir, he
will not desire! Strange indeed, if, what he is thought fool-hardy for
prating now, this he would not accomplish if he might. As to the vast
difference between a war here or there, I fancy there needs no argument.
If you were obliged to be out yourselves for thirty days only, and take
the necessaries for camp-service from the land, (I mean, without an
enemy therein,) your agricultural population would sustain, I believe,
greater damage than what the whole expense of the late war [Footnote:
The Amphipolitan war, said to have cost fifteen hundred talents.]
amounted to. But if a war should come, what damage must be expected?
There is the insult too, and the disgrace of the thing, worse than any
damage to right-thinking men.
On all these accounts, then, we must unite to lend our succor, and drive
off the war yonder; the rich, that, spending a little for the abundance
which they happily possess, they may enjoy the residue in security; the
young, [Footnote: Strictly, those of the military age, which was from
eighteen years to sixty. Youths between eighteen and twenty were
liable only to serve in Attica, and were chiefly employed to garrison the
walls. Afterward they were compellable to perform any military service,
under the penalty of losing their privileges as citizens. The expression
in the text, it will be seen, is not rendered with full accuracy; as those
of the military age can only be called young by comparison. But a short
and apt antithesis was needed. Sometimes I have "the service-able" or
"the able-bodied." Jacobs: die waffenfahigen Junglinge, and elsewhere,
die Rustige.] that, gaining military experience in Philip's territory, they
may become redoubtable champions to preserve their own; the orators,
that they may pass a good account [Footnote: Every man, who is
required to justify the acts for which he is responsible, may be said to
be "called to account." But Demosthenes spoke with peculiar reference
to those accounts, which men in official situations at Athens were

required to render at the close of their administration.] of their
statesmanship; for on the result of measures will depend your judgment
of their conduct. May it for every cause be prosperous.

THE SECOND OLYNTHIAC.
THE ARGUMENT.
The Athenians had voted an alliance with the Olynthians, and resolved
to send succors. But the sending of them was delayed, partly by the
contrivance of the opposite faction, partly from the reluctance of the
people themselves to engage in a war with Philip. Demosthenes
stimulates them to exertion, and encourages them, by showing that
Philip's power is not so great as it appears.
On many occasions, men of Athens, one may see the kindness of the
gods to this country manifested, but most signally, I think, on the
present. That here are men prepared for a war with Philip, possessed of
a neighboring territory and some power, and (what is most important)
so fixed in their hostility, as to regard any accommodation with him as
insecure, and even ruinous to their country; this really appears like an
extraordinary act of divine beneficence. It must then be our care,
Athenians, that we are not more unkind to ourselves than circumstances
have been; as it would be a foul, a most foul reproach, to have
abandoned not only cities and places that once belonged to us, but also
the allies and advantages provided