The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915 | Page 6

as justified."
[German "White Paper," Annex 1B.]
How could Germany thus indorse the "demands" if it did not know the substance of the ultimatum?
The hour when these instructions were sent is not given, so that it does not follow that these significant instructions were necessarily prior to the service of the ultimatum at Belgrade at 6 P.M. Nevertheless, as the ultimatum did not reach the other capitals of Europe until the following day, as the diplomatic correspondence clearly shows, it seems improbable that the German Foreign Office would have issued this very carefully prepared and formal warning to the other powers on July the 23d unless it had not only knowledge of Austria's intention to serve the ultimatum but also at least of the substance thereof.
While it may be that Germany, while indorsing in blank the policy of Austria, purposely refrained from examining the text of the communication, so that it could thereafter claim that it was not responsible for Austria's action--a policy which would not lessen the discreditable character of the whole business--yet the more reasonable assumption is that the simultaneous issuance of Austria's ultimatum at Belgrade and Germany's warning to the powers were the result of a concerted action and had a common purpose. No court or jury, reasoning along the ordinary inferences of human life, would question this conclusion for a moment.
The communication for the German Foreign Office last referred to anticipates that Servia "will refuse to comply with these demands"--why, if they were justified?--and Germany suggests to France, England, and Russia that if, as a result of such non-compliance, Austria has "recourse to military measures," that "the choice of means must be left to it."
The German Ambassadors in the three capitals were instructed
"to lay particular stress on the view that the above question is one the settlement of which devolves solely upon Austria-Hungary and Servia, and one which the powers should earnestly strive to confine to the two countries concerned,"
and he added that Germany strongly desired
"that the dispute be localized, since any intervention of another power, on account of the various alliance obligations, would bring consequences impossible to measure."
This is one of the most significant documents in the whole correspondence. If Germany were as ignorant as her Ambassador at London affected to be of the Austrian policy and ultimatum, and if Germany was not then instigating and supporting Austria in its perilous course, why should the German Chancellor have served this threatening notice upon England, France, and Russia, that Austria must be left free to make war upon Servia, and that any attempt to intervene in behalf of the weaker nation would "bring consequences impossible to measure"?
[German "White Paper," Annex 1B.]
A few days later the Imperial Chancellor sent to the Confederated Governments of Germany a confidential communication in which he recognized the possibility that Russia might feel it a duty "to take the part of Servia in her dispute with Austria-Hungary." Why, again, if Austria's case was so clearly justified? The Imperial Chancellor added that
"if Russia feels constrained to take sides with Servia in this conflict, she certainly has a right to do it,"
but added that if Russia did this it would in effect challenge the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that Russia would therefore alone--
"bear the responsibility if a European war arises from the Austro-Servian question, which all the rest of the great European powers wish to localize."
In this significant confidential communication the German Chancellor declares the strong interest which Germany had in the punishment of Servia by Austria. He says "_our closest interests therefore summon us to the side of Austria-Hungary_," and he adds that
"if contrary to hope, the trouble should spread, owing to the intervention of Russia, then, true to our duty as an ally, we should have to support the neighboring monarchy with the entire might of the German Empire."
[German "White Paper," Annex 2.]
In reaching its conclusion our imaginary court would pay little attention to mere professions of a desire for peace. A nation, like an individual, can covertly stab the peace of another while saying, "Art thou in health, my brother?" and even the peace of civilization can be betrayed by a Judas kiss. Professions of peace belong to the cant of diplomacy and have always characterized the most bellicose of nations.
No war in modern times has been begun without the aggressor pretending that his nation wished nothing but peace and invoking Divine aid for its murderous policy. To paraphrase the words of Lady Teazle on a noted occasion when Sir Joseph Surface talked much of "honor," it might be as well in such instances to leave the name of God out of the question.
Let us, then, analyze the record as already made up; and for the sake of clearness the events which preceded the war will be considered chronologically.
Immediately upon the