The Moral Economy | Page 4

excitation is morally
indeterminate, 201. Such influences must be selected with reference to
their effect on moral purpose, 202.
VII. ART AS A MEANS OF FIXING IDEAS . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
The higher practical ideas have no other concrete embodiment than art,
203. Art both fixes ideas and arouses sentiment in their behalf, 204. But
if art is to serve this end it must be true, 205. Untruth in art, 206.
Universality and particularity in art, 207. Art may invest ideas with a
fictitious value, 208.
VIII. THE LIBERALITY OF THE AESTHETIC INTEREST . . . . . . .
209
Art is unworldly, 209. The aesthetic intercourse promotes social
intercourse on a high plane, 210.
IX. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
When subjected to moral control, art may make the environment
harmonious with morality, 212.

CHAPTER VI
THE MORAL JUSTIFICATION OF RELIGION . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
I. THE DEFINITION OF RELIGION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
The sound practical motive in religion, 214. Religion as belief, 216.
Summary definition of religion, 218.
II. THE TESTS OF RELIGION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
The measure of religion, extensive and intensive, 218. The test of truth
the fundamental test, 220. The therapeutic test, and its confusion of the
issue, 222. The two forms of the truth test, cosmological and ethical,
224. The working of these critical principles, 226. Cosmology and
ethics are independent of religion, 228. The optimistic bias, 231.
Summary of religious development, 231.
III. SUPERSTITION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
The prudential character of superstition, 232. The ethical idea in
primitive religion, 233. The cosmological idea, 234. The method of
primitive religion, 235. Superstition in Christianity, 235. The ethical
and cosmological correction of superstition, 236.
IV. TUTELARY RELIGION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
The deity identified with the purpose of the worshipper, 237. The
national religion of the Assyrians and Egyptians, 238. The correction of
tutelary religion, 239.
V. PHILOSOPHICAL RELIGION. METAPHYSICAL
IDEALISM . . . . . 241
Religion formally enlightened, 241. Metaphysical and moral idealism,
242. The inherent difficulty in metaphysical idealism, 242. The swing
from formalism to materialism. Pessimism, other-worldliness,
mysticism, panlogism and aesthetic idealism, 243. Aesthetic idealism

falsifies experience and discredits moral distinctions, 246.
VI. MORAL IDEALISM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
Moral idealism reflects moral judgment, 248. Evil real but not
deliberately perpetrated. The knowledge of evil, 249. The ground of
moral idealism, 252.
VII. THE GENERIC VALUE OF RELIGION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
Religion morally inevitable, 252. The value of the religious
generalization of life, 253. The immediate reward of service, 254.
Religion and moral enthusiasm, 254. Culture and religion, 255.
NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

{1}
THE MORAL ECONOMY
CHAPTER I
MORALITY AS THE ORGANIZATION OF LIFE
In the words with which this book is inscribed, Bishop Butler conveys
with directness and gravity the conviction that morality is neither a
mystery nor a convention, but simply an observance of the laws of
provident living. "Things and actions are what they are, and the
consequences of them will be what they will be: why then should we
desire to be deceived?" [1] This appeal, commonplace enough, but
confident and true, sounds the note with which through all that follows
I shall hope to keep in unison.
It is because he professes to believe that morality is an imposture that
must be smuggled into society behind the back of reason, that Nietsche

makes a merit of its dulness. "It is desirable," he says, "that as few
people as possible should reflect upon morals, and consequently it is
very desirable that morals should not some day become interesting!" [2]
He confesses that he sees no occasion for alarm! But the dulness of {2}
morality testifies only to its homeliness and antiquity. For to