The Moral Economy | Page 3

perverts life by denying this world, 118.
Quietism, 119. Mystical perversion of moral truth, 120.
VII. SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
The interworking of the formal and the material principles, 121.
Importance of the formal principle. Manners and worship, 121.
CHAPTER IV
THE MORAL TEST OF PROGRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
I. THE GENERAL THEORY OF PROGRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
The philosophy of history, 123. The meaning of progress, 125. Progress
and the Quantitative basis of preference, 127. The method of
superimposition as a test of progress, 127.

CONTENTS
II. THE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL PRINCIPLES OF
PROGRESS . . . . 130
The external principle: the pressure of an unfavorable environment, 130.
The external and the internal principle, 131. The internally progressive
type of society. The importance of discussion, 132. Rationality the
internal principle of progress, 134. The positive motive: constructive
reform, 134. Disinterested reflection and the man of affairs, 136.
Success depends on moral capacity, 137. The negative motive:
revolution, 139. Christianity as a social revolution, 140. The French
Revolution, 141. Dependence of progress on the historical
connectedness of human life, 143.
III. CONSERVATISM AND RADICALISM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
Conservatism values the existing order, 144. Progress requires the
maintenance and use of order, 145. The real radical not the sceptic but
the rationalist, 145. The justification of the radical, 146.
IV. PROGRESS IN THE INSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT . . . . . . .
147
Institutions are permanent moral necessities, 147. Government as the
interest both of the weak and of the strong, 148. The moral necessity of
government, 150. The variable and progressive factor in government,
151. The principle of rationality in government, 152. The benefits and
cost of government in the ancient military monarchy, 152. Solidarity of
interest in the Greek and Roman oligarchies, 154. Advance in liberality
in Athenian institutions, 156. The development of modern institutions,
157. The modern idea of democracy, 158. Summary of the modern
state. It is territorial and impersonal, 160. The representative method,
160. Emphasis on internal policy and international peace, 162.
V. THE QUALITY OF CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM . . . . . . . . .
163

Democracy based not on pity but on enlightenment, 163. The respect
for the opinion of those most interested, 164. The spirit of modern
justice, 165. Sensitiveness to life, 166. The allowance for growth, 167.
The individual and the crowd, 168. Hopefulness and the bias of
maturity, 169. The work done and the work to do, 170.
CHAPTER V
THE MORAL CRITICISM OF FINE ART . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
I. THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE MORAL CRITICISM OF
ART . . . . . 171
The higher activities of civilization, 171. The attempt to apply aesthetic
standards to life, 172. The claim of art to exemption from moral
criticism is based on misapprehension. Morality not a special interest,
but the fundamental interest, 174. Morality does not substitute its
canons for those of art, 175.
II. DEFINITION OF ART AND THE ESTHETIC INTEREST . . . . . .
176
Art as the adaptation of the environment to interest, 176. Industrial art
and fine art, 177. The aesthetic interest: the interest in apprehension,
179. The interest in sensation and perception, 181. The emotional
interest, 182. Instinct and emotion in the aesthetic experience. Poetry
and music, 183. The interest in discernment, 185. The representative
element in art exemplified in Greek sculpture, 185. And in Italian
painting of the Renaissance, 187. Levels and blendings of the aesthetic
interest, 189. The moral criticism of the aesthetic interest, 190.
III. THE SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF THE AESTHETIC
INTEREST . . . . 192
The aesthetic interest is capable of continuous development, 192. And
is resourceful, 192. But tends on that account to be narrow and
quiescent, 192.

IV. THE PERVASIVENESS OF THE ESTHETIC INTEREST . . . . . . .
194
The aesthetic interest may supply interest where there is none, or
enhance other interests, 194. But it must not be allowed to replace other
interests, 195.
V. THE VICARIOUS FUNCTION OF THE AESTHETIC
INTEREST . . . . 197
Other interests may be represented by the aesthetic interest, 197. The
danger of confusing vicarious fulfilment with real fulfilment, 198. And
of being aesthetically satisfied with failure, 199.
VI. ART AS A MEANS OF STIMULATING ACTION . . . . . . . . . .
201
Art is a source of motor excitation,201. But such