The Federalist Papers | Page 9

them to justify all their actions, and opposes
their acknowledging, correcting, or repairing their errors and offenses.
The national government, in such cases, will not be affected by this
pride, but will proceed with moderation and candor to consider and
decide on the means most proper to extricate them from the difficulties
which threaten them.
Besides, it is well known that acknowledgments, explanations, and
compensations are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong united
nation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by a State
or confederacy of little consideration or power.
In the year 1685, the state of Genoa having offended Louis XIV.,
endeavored to appease him. He demanded that they should send their

Doge, or chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their senators, to
FRANCE, to ask his pardon and receive his terms. They were obliged
to submit to it for the sake of peace. Would he on any occasion either
have demanded or have received the like humiliation from Spain, or
Britain, or any other POWERFUL nation?
PUBLIUS
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FEDERALIST No. 4
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign
Force and Influence) For the Independent Journal. Wednesday,
November 7, 1787
JAY
To the People of the State of New York:
MY LAST paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the people
would be best secured by union against the danger it may be exposed to
by JUST causes of war given to other nations; and those reasons show
that such causes would not only be more rarely given, but would also
be more easily accommodated, by a national government than either by
the State governments or the proposed little confederacies.
But the safety of the people of America against dangers from
FOREIGN force depends not only on their forbearing to give JUST
causes of war to other nations, but also on their placing and continuing
themselves in such a situation as not to INVITE hostility or insult; for it
need not be observed that there are PRETENDED as well as just
causes of war.
It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that
nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of
getting anything by it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make war
when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for the purposes and

objects merely personal, such as thirst for military glory, revenge for
personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or
support their particular families or partisans. These and a variety of
other motives, which affect only the mind of the sovereign, often lead
him to engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and
interests of his people. But, independent of these inducements to war,
which are more prevalent in absolute monarchies, but which well
deserve our attention, there are others which affect nations as often as
kings; and some of them will on examination be found to grow out of
our relative situation and circumstances.
With France and with Britain we are rivals in the fisheries, and can
supply their markets cheaper than they can themselves,
notwithstanding any efforts to prevent it by bounties on their own or
duties on foreign fish.
With them and with most other European nations we are rivals in
navigation and the carrying trade; and we shall deceive ourselves if we
suppose that any of them will rejoice to see it flourish; for, as our
carrying trade cannot increase without in some degree diminishing
theirs, it is more their interest, and will be more their policy, to restrain
than to promote it.
In the trade to China and India, we interfere with more than one nation,
inasmuch as it enables us to partake in advantages which they had in a
manner monopolized, and as we thereby supply ourselves with
commodities which we used to purchase from them.
The extension of our own commerce in our own vessels cannot give
pleasure to any nations who possess territories on or near this
continent, because the cheapness and excellence of our productions,
added to the circumstance of vicinity, and the enterprise and address of
our merchants and navigators, will give us a greater share in the
advantages which those territories afford, than consists with the wishes
or policy of their respective sovereigns.
Spain thinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on the one
side, and Britain excludes us from the Saint Lawrence on the other; nor

will either of them permit the other waters which are between them and
us to become the means of mutual intercourse and traffic.
From these and such like considerations, which might, if consistent
with prudence, be more amplified and detailed, it is easy to see that
jealousies and uneasinesses may gradually slide into the minds and
cabinets of other nations,