The Federalist Papers | Page 8

that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national
government than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by
three or four distinct confederacies.
Because when once an efficient national government is established, the
best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also will
generally be appointed to manage it; for, although town or country, or
other contracted influence, may place men in State assemblies, or
senates, or courts of justice, or executive departments, yet more
general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications
will be necessary to recommend men to offices under the national
government, -- especially as it will have the widest field for choice, and
never experience that want of proper persons which is not uncommon
in some of the States. Hence, it will result that the administration, the
political counsels, and the judicial decisions of the national
government will be more wise, systematical, and judicious than those of
individual States, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to
other nations, as well as more SAFE with respect to us.
Because, under the national government, treaties and articles of
treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one
sense and executed in the same manner, -- whereas, adjudications on

the same points and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or four
confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent; and that, as
well from the variety of independent courts and judges appointed by
different and independent governments, as from the different local laws
and interests which may affect and influence them. The wisdom of the
convention, in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and
judgment of courts appointed by and responsible only to one national
government, cannot be too much commended.
Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the
governing party in one or two States to swerve from good faith and
justice; but those temptations, not reaching the other States, and
consequently having little or no influence on the national government,
the temptation will be fruitless, and good faith and justice be preserved.
The case of the treaty of peace with Britain adds great weight to this
reasoning.
Because, even if the governing party in a State should be disposed to
resist such temptations, yet as such temptations may, and commonly do,
result from circumstances peculiar to the State, and may affect a great
number of the inhabitants, the governing party may not always be able,
if willing, to prevent the injustice meditated, or to punish the
aggressors. But the national government, not being affected by those
local circumstances, will neither be induced to commit the wrong
themselves, nor want power or inclination to prevent or punish its
commission by others.
So far, therefore, as either designed or accidental violations of treaties
and the laws of nations afford JUST causes of war, they are less to be
apprehended under one general government than under several lesser
ones, and in that respect the former most favors the SAFETY of the
people.
As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and unlawful
violence, it appears equally clear to me that one good national
government affords vastly more security against dangers of that sort
than can be derived from any other quarter.

Because such violences are more frequently caused by the passions and
interests of a part than of the whole; of one or two States than of the
Union. Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions
of the present federal government, feeble as it is; but there are several
instances of Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper
conduct of individual States, who, either unable or unwilling to restrain
or punish offenses, have given occasion to the slaughter of many
innocent inhabitants.
The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering on
some States and not on others, naturally confines the causes of quarrel
more immediately to the borderers. The bordering States, if any, will be
those who, under the impulse of sudden irritation, and a quick sense of
apparent interest or injury, will be most likely, by direct violence, to
excite war with these nations; and nothing can so effectually obviate
that danger as a national government, whose wisdom and prudence
will not be diminished by the passions which actuate the parties
immediately interested.
But not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national
government, but it will also be more in their power to accommodate
and settle them amicably. They will be more temperate and cool, and in
that respect, as well as in others, will be more in capacity to act
advisedly than the offending State. The pride of states, as well as of
men, naturally disposes