The Discovery of a World in the Moone | Page 6

labour of mind, some travaile and discourse of the
understanding, and many lazie soules had rather quietly repose
themselves in an easie errour, then take paines to search out the truth.
The strangenesse then of this opinion which I now deliver will be a
great hinderance to its beliefe, but this is not to be respected by reason
it cannot bee helped. I have stood the longer in the Preface, because
that prejudice which the meere title of the booke may beget cannot
easily be removed without a great deale of preparation, and I could not
tell otherwise how to rectifie the thoughts of the Reader for an
impartiall survey of the following discourse.
I must needs confesse, though I had often thought with my selfe that it
was possible there might be a world in the Moone, yet it seemed such

an uncouth opinion that I never durst discover it, for feare of being
counted singular and ridiculous, but afterward having read Plutarch,
Galilæus, Keplar, with some others, and finding many of mine owne
thoughts confirmed by such strong authority, I then concluded that it
was not onely possible there might bee, but probable that there was
another habitable world in that Planet. In the prosecuting of this
assertion, I shall first endeavour to cleare the way from such doubts as
may hinder the speed or ease of farther progresse; and because the
suppositions imply'd in this opinion may seeme to contradict the
principles of reason or faith, it will be requisite that I first remove this
scruple, shewing the conformity of them to both these, and proving
those truths that may make way for the rest, which I shall labour to
performe in the second, third, fourth, and fifth Chapters, and then
proceede to confirme such Propositions, which doe more directly
belong to the maine point in hand.

Proposition 2.
That a plurality of worlds doth not contradict any principle of reason
or faith.
Tis reported of Aristotle that when hee saw the bookes of Moses he
commended them for such a majesticke stile as might become a God,
but withall hee censured that manner of writing to be very unfitting for
a Philosopher because there was nothing proved in them, but matters
were delivered as if they would rather command than perswade beliefe.
And 'tis observed that hee sets downe nothing himselfe, but he
confirmes it by the strongest reasons that may be found, there being
scarce an argument of force for any subject in Philosophy which may
not bee picked out of his writings, and therefore 'tis likely if there were
in reason a necessity of one onely world, that hee would have found out
some such necessary proofe as might confirme it: Especially since hee
labours for it so much in two whole Chapters. But now all the
arguments which he himselfe urges in this subject,[1] are very weake
and farre enough from having in them any convincing power. Therefore
'tis likely that a plurality of worlds doth not contradict any principle of

reason. However, I will set downe the two chiefe of his arguments from
his owne workes, and from them you may guesse the force of the other.
The 1. is this,[2] since every heavy body doth naturally tend
downwards, and every light body upwards, what a hudling and
confusion must there bee if there were two places for gravity and two
places for lightnesse: for it is probable that the Earth of that other
World would fall downe to this Center, and so mutually the aire and
fire here ascend to those Regions in the other, which must needes much
derogate from the providence of nature, and cause a great disorder in
his workes. To this I answere, that if you will consider the nature of
gravity, you will plainely see there is no ground to feare any such
confusion, for heavinesse is nothing else but such a quality as causes a
propension in 'its subject to tend downewards towards its owne Centre,
so that for some of that earth to come hither would not bee said a fall
but an ascension, since it moved from its owne place, and this would
bee impossible (saith Ruvio) because against nature,[3] and therefore
no more to bee feared than the falling of the Heavens.
[Sidenote 1: De Coelo l. 1. c. 8. 9.]
[Sidenote 2: Ibid.]
[Sidenote 3: De Coelo l. 1. c. 9. q. 1.]
Another Argument hee had from his master Plato,[1] that there is but
one World, because there is but one first mover, God.[2]
[Sidenote 1: Metaphys. l. 12. c. 8.]
[Sidenote 2: Diog. Laert. lib. 3.]
But here I may deny the consequence, since a plurality of worlds doth
not take away the unity of the first mover.
Vt enim