The Discovery of a World in the Moone | Page 5

lesse note
and learning, but believed also, by the more famous and wiser sort,
such as were those great Poets, Stesichorus and Pindar. And not onely
amongst the more sottish heathens, who might account that Planet to be
one of their Gods, but the primitive Christians also were in this kinde
guilty; which made S. Ambrose so tartly to rebuke those of his time,
when he said,
Tum turbatur carminibus Globus Lunæ, quando calicibus turbantur &
oculi.
"When your heads are troubled with cups, then you thinke the Moone
to be troubled with charmes."

And for this reason also did Maximus a Bishop,[1] write a Homily
against it, wherein hee shewed the absurditie of that foolish superstition.
I remember, that Ludovicus Uives relates a more ridiculous story of a
people that imprisoned an Asse for drinking up the Moone, whose
image appearing in the water was covered with a cloud, as the Asse
was drinking, for which the poore beast was afterward brought to the
barre to receive a sentence according to his deserts, where the grave
Senate being set to examine the matter, one of the Counsell (perhaps
wiser than the rest) rises up, and out of his deepe judgement, thinkes it
not fit that their Towne should lose its Moone, but that rather the Asse
should be cut up, and that taken out of him, which sentence being
approved by the rest of those Politicians, as the subtillest way for the
conclusion of the matter was accordingly performed. But whether this
tale were true or no I will not question, however there is absurdity
enough in that former custome of the ancients, that may confirme the
truth to be proved, and plainly declare the insufficiency of common
opinion to adde true worth or estimation unto any thing. So that from
that which I have said may be gathered thus much.
[Sidenote 1: Turinens. Episc.]
1. That a new truth may seeme absurd and impossible not onely to the
vulgar, but to those also who are otherwise wise men, and excellent
schollers; and hence it will follow, that every new thing which seemes
to oppose common Principles is not presently to be rejected, but rather
to be pry'd into with a diligent enquiry, since there are many things
which are yet hid from us, and reserv'd for future discovery.
2. That it is not the commonnesse of an opinion that can priviledge it
for a truth, the wrong way is sometime a well beaten path, whereas the
right way (especially to hidden truths) may bee lesse trodden and more
obscure.
True indeed, the strangeness of this opinion will detract much from its
credit; but yet we should know that nothing is in its selfe strange, since
every naturall effect has an equall dependance upon its cause, and with
the like necessity doth follow from it, so that 'tis our ignorance which
makes things appeare so, and hence it comes to passe that many more

evident truths seeme incredible to such who know not the causes of
things: you may as soone perswade some Country peasants that the
Moone is made of greene Cheese (as wee say) as that 'tis bigger than
his Cart-wheele, since both seeme equally to contradict his sight, and
hee has not reason enough to leade him farther than his senses. Nay,
suppose (saith Plutarch) a Philosopher should be educated in such a
secret place, where hee might not see either Sea or River, and
afterwards should be brought out where one might shew him the great
Ocean telling him the quality of that water, that it is blackish, salt, and
not potable, and yet there were many vast creatures of all formes living
in it, which make use of the water as wee doe of the aire, questionlesse
he would laugh at all this, as being monstrous lies & fables, without
any colour of truth. Just so will this truth which I now deliver appeare
unto others; because we never dreamt of any such matter as a world in
the Moone, because the state of that place hath as yet been vailed from
our knowledge, therefore wee can scarcely assent to any such matter.
Things are very hardly received which are altogether strange to our
thoughts and our senses. The soule may with lesse difficulty be brought
to believe any absurdity, when as it has formerly beene acquainted with
some colours and probabilities for it, but when a new, and an unheard
of truth shall come before it, though it have good grounds and reasons,
yet the understanding is afraid of it as a stranger, and dares not admit it
into its beliefe without a great deale of reluctancy and tryall. And
besides things that are not manifested to the senses, are not assented
unto without some