The Case for India | Page 7

be overwhelmed by a wave of fanaticism, or by a
successful Jehad of the tribes.... It suffices to mention that, although
during the previous three years there had been no operations of any
importance on the North-West frontier, there were, between November
29, 1914, and September 5, 1915, no less than seven serious attacks on
the North-West frontier, all of which were effectively dealt with.
The military authorities had also to meet a German conspiracy early in
1915, 7,000 men arriving from Canada and the United States, having
planned to seize points of military vantage in the Panjab, and in
December of the same year another German conspiracy in Bengal,
necessitating military preparations on land, and also naval patrols in the
Bay of Bengal.
Lord Hardinge has been much attacked by the Tory and Unionist Press
in England and India, in England because of the Mesopotamia Report,
in India because his love for India brought him hatred from
Anglo-India. India has affirmed her confidence in him, and with India's
verdict he may well rest satisfied.
I do not care to dwell on the Mesopotamia Commission and its
condemnation of the bureaucratic system prevailing here. Lord
Hardinge vindicated himself and India. The bureaucratic system
remains undefended. I recall that bureaucratic inefficiency came out in
even more startling fashion in connection with the Afghan War of
1878-79 and 1879-80. In February 1880, the war charges were reported
as under £4 millions, and the accounts showed a surplus of £2 millions.
On April 8th the Government of India reported: "Outgoing for War
very alarming, far exceeding estimate," and on the 13th April "it was

announced that the cash balances had fallen in three months from
thirteen crores to less than nine, owing to 'excessive Military drain' ...
On the following day (April 22) a despatch was sent out to the Viceroy,
showing that there appeared a deficiency of not less than 5-1/4 crores.
This vast error was evidently due to an underestimate of war liabilities,
which had led to such mis-information being laid before Parliament,
and to the sudden discovery of inability to 'meet the usual drawings.'"
It seemed that the Government knew only the amount audited, not the
amount spent. Payments were entered as "advances," though they were
not recoverable, and "the great negligence was evidently that of the
heads of departmental accounts." If such a mishap should occur under
Home Rule, a few years hence--which heaven forbid--I shudder to
think of the comments of the Englishman and the Madras Mail on the
shocking inefficiency of Indian officials.
In September last, our present Viceroy, H.E. Lord Chelmsford,
defended India against later attacks by critics who try to minimise her
sacrifices in order to lessen the gratitude felt by Great Britain towards
her, lest that gratitude should give birth to justice, and justice should
award freedom to India. Lord Chelmsford placed before his Council "in
studiously considered outline, a summary of what India has done
during the past two years." Omitting his references to what was done
under Lord Hardinge, as stated above, I may quote from him:
On the outbreak of war, of the 4,598 British officers on the Indian
establishment, 530 who were at home on leave were detained by the
War Office for service in Europe. 2,600 Combatant Officers have been
withdrawn from India since the beginning of the War, excluding those
who proceeded on service with their batteries or regiments. In order to
make good these deficiencies and provide for war wastage the Indian
Army Reserve of Officers was expanded from a total of 40, at which it
stood on the 4th August, 1914, to one of 2,000.
The establishment of Indian units has not only been kept up to strength,
but has been considerably increased. There has been an augmentation
of 20 per cent. in the cavalry and of 40 per cent. in the infantry, while
the number of recruits enlisted since the beginning of the War is greater

than the entire strength of the Indian Army as it existed on August 4,
1914.
Lord Chelmsford rightly pointed out:
The Army in India has thus proved a great Imperial asset, and in
weighing the value of India's contribution to the War it should be
remembered that India's forces were no hasty improvisation, but were
an army in being, fully equipped and supplied, which had previously
cost India annually a large sum to maintain.
Lord Chelmsford has established what he calls a "Man-Power Board,"
the duty of which is "to collect and co-ordinate all the facts with regard
to the supply of man-power in India." It has branches in all the
Provinces. A steady flow of reinforcements supplies the wastage at the
various fronts, and the labour required for engineering, transport, etc.,
is now organised in 20 corps in Mesopotamia and