The Case for India | Page 6

of about
one-third of the whole British Army in addition to her own Indian
troops. Surely these facts should be remembered when India's military
services to the Empire are now being weighed.
In 1904 and 1905, the Congress declared that the then military
expenditure was beyond India's power to bear, and in the latter year
prayed that the additional ten millions sterling sanctioned for Lord
Kitchener's reorganisation scheme might be devoted to education and
the reduction of the burden on the raiyats. In 1908, the burdens
imposed by the British War Office since 1859 were condemned, and in
the next year it was pointed out that the military expenditure was nearly
a third of the whole Indian revenue, and was starving Education and
Sanitation.
Lord Kitchener's reorganisation scheme kept the Indian Army on a War
footing, ready for immediate mobilisation, and on January 1, 1915, the
regular army consisted of 247,000 men, of whom 75,000 were English;
it was the money spent by India in maintaining this army for years in
readiness for War which made it possible for her to go to the help of
Great Britain at the critical early period to which I alluded. She spent
over £20 millions on the military services in 1914-15. In 1915-16 she
spent £21.8 millions. In 1916-17 her military budget had risen to £12
millions, and it will probably be exceeded, as was the budget of the
preceding year by £1-2/3 million.
Lord Hardinge, the last Viceroy of India, who is ever held in loving
memory here for his sympathetic attitude towards Indian aspirations,
made a masterly exposition of India's War services in the House of
Lords on the third of last July. He emphasised her pre-War services,
showing that though 19-1/4 millions sterling was fixed as a maximum
by the Nicholson Committee, that amount had been exceeded in 11 out
of the last 13 budgets, while his own last budget had risen to 22
millions. During these 13 years the revenue had been only between 48
and 58 millions, once rising to 60 millions. Could any fact speak more
eloquently of India's War services than this proportion of military

expenditure compared with her revenue?
The Great War began on August 4th, and in that very month and in the
early part of September, India sent an expeditionary force of three
divisions--two infantry and one cavalry--and another cavalry division
joined them in France in November. The first arrived, said Lord
Hardinge, "in time to fill a gap that could not otherwise have been
filled." He added pathetically: "There are very few survivors of those
two splendid divisions of infantry." Truly, their homes are empty, but
their sons shall enjoy in India the liberty for which their fathers died in
France. Three more divisions were at once sent to guard the Indian
frontier, while in September a mixed division was sent to East Africa,
and in October and November two more divisions and a brigade of
cavalry went to Egypt. A battalion of Indian infantry went to Mauritius,
another to the Cameroons, and two to the Persian Gulf, while other
Indian troops helped the Japanese in the capture of Tsingtau. 210,000
Indians were thus sent overseas. The whole of these troops were fully
armed and equipped, and in addition, during the first few weeks of the
War, India sent to England from her magazines "70 million rounds of
small-arm ammunition, 60,000 rifles, and more than 550 guns of the
latest pattern and type."
In addition to these, Lord Hardinge speaks of sending to England
enormous quantities of material,... tents, boots, saddlery, clothing, etc.,
but every effort was made to meet the ever-increasing demands made
by the War Office, and it may be stated without exaggeration that India
was bled absolutely white during the first few weeks of the war.
It must not be forgotten, though Lord Hardinge has not reckoned it, that
all wastage has been more than filled up, and 450,000 men represent
this head; the increase in units has been 300,000, and including other
military items India had placed in the field up to the end of 1916 over a
million of men.
In addition to this a British force of 80,000 was sent from India, fully
trained and equipped at Indian cost, India receiving in exchange, many
months later, 34 Territorial battalions and 29 batteries, "unfit for

immediate employment on the frontier or in Mesopotamia, until they
had been entirely re-armed and equipped, and their training
completed."
Between the autumn of 1914 and the close of 1915, the defence of our
own frontiers was a serious matter, and Lord Hardinge says:
The attitude of Afghanistan was for a long time doubtful, although I
always had confidence in the personal loyalty of our ally the Amir; but
I feared lest he might