The Balkan Wars: 1912-1913 | Page 3

the other
Balkan States win her over, as they not inconceivably might do, if they
rose to the heights of unwonted statesmanship by recognizing her claim
to that part of Macedonia in which the Bulgarian element predominates
but which was ceded to her rivals by the Treaty of Bukarest.
But I have said enough to indicate that as in its origin so also in its
results this awful cataclysm under which the civilized world is now
reeling will be found to be vitally connected with the Balkan Wars of
1912-1913. And I conclude with the hope that the present volume,

which devotes indeed but little space to military matters and none at all
to atrocities and massacres, may prove helpful to readers who seek light
on the underlying conditions, the causes, and the consequences of those
historic struggles. The favor already accorded to the work and the rapid
exhaustion of the first edition* seem to furnish some justification of
this hope.
JACOB GOULD SCHURMAN.
November 26, 1914.
* The present work is rather, a reprint than a new edition, few changes
having been made except the correction of typographical errors.

INTRODUCTION
The changes made in the map of Europe by the Balkan Wars of
1912-1913 were not merely the occasion but a cause and probably the
most potent, and certainly the most urgent, of all the causes that led to
the World War which has been raging with such titanic fury since the
summer of 1914.
Had the Balkan Allies after their triumph over Turkey not fallen out
amongst themselves, had there been no second Balkan War in 1913,
had the Turkish provinces wrested from the Porte by the united arms of
Bulgaria, Greece, Servia, and Montenegro been divided amongst the
victors either by diplomacy or arbitration substantial justice would have
been done to all, none of them would have been humiliated, and their
moderation and concord would have commended their achievement to
the Great Powers who might perhaps have secured the acquiescence of
Austria-Hungary in the necessary enlargement of Servia and the
expansion of Greece to Saloniki and beyond.
But the outbreak of the second Balkan War nullified all these fair
prospects. And Bulgaria, who brought it on, found herself encircled by
enemies, including not only all her recent Allies against Turkey, but
also Turkey herself, and even Roumania, who had remained a neutral
spectator of the first Balkan War. Of course Bulgaria was defeated.
And a terrible punishment was inflicted on her. She was stripped of a
large part of the territory she had just conquered from Turkey,
including her most glorious battle-fields; her original provinces were
dismembered; her extension to the Aegean Sea was seriously
obstructed, if not practically blocked; and, bitterest and most tragic of

all, the redemption of the Bulgarians in Macedonia, which was the
principal object and motive of her war against Turkey in 1912, was
frustrated and rendered hopeless by Greek and Servian annexations of
Macedonian territory extending from the Mesta to the Drin with the
great cities of Saloniki, Kavala, and Monastir, which in the patriotic
national consciousness had long loomed up as fixed points in the
"manifest destiny" of Bulgaria.
That the responsibility for precipitating the second Balkan War rests on
Bulgaria is demonstrated in the latter portion of this volume. Yet the
intransigent and bellicose policy of Bulgaria was from the point of
view of her own interests so short-sighted, so perilous, so foolish and
insane that it seemed, even at the time, to be directed by some external
power and for some ulterior purpose. No proof, however, was then
available. But hints of that suspicion were clearly conveyed even in the
first edition of this volume, which, it may be recalled, antedates the
outbreak of the great European War. Thus, on page 103, the question
was put:
"Must we assume that there is some ground for suspecting that
Austria-Hungary was inciting Bulgaria to war?"
And again, on page 108, with reference to General Savoff's order
directing the attack on the Greek and Servian forces which initiated the
second Balkan War, the inquiry was made:
"Did General Savoff act on his own responsibility? Or is there any truth
in the charge that King Ferdinand, after a long consultation with the
Austro-Hungarian Minister, instructed the General to issue the order?"
These questions may now be answered with positive assurance. What
was only surmise when this volume was written is to-day indubitable
certainty. The proof is furnished by the highest authorities both Italian
and Russian.
When the second Balkan War broke out San Giuliano was Prime
Minister of Italy. And he has recently published the fact that at that
time--the summer of 1913--the Austro-Hungarian government
communicated to the Italian government its intention of making war on
Servia and claimed under the terms of