Select Speeches of Kossuth | Page 2

on the Republicanism of Kossuth; secondly, on the Hungarian levies against Italy in the year 1848.
1. Kossuth is attacked by his countrymen on opposite grounds: Szemer�� despises him for not becoming a republican early enough, Count Casimir Bathyanyi reproves him for becoming a republican at all. The facts are these. Kossuth, like all English statesmen, was a historical royalist, not a doctrinaire. When the existing reign had become treacherous and lawless, he was willing to change the line of succession, and make the Archduke Stephen king. When the dynasty had become universally detested and actually expelled, he approved most heartily[*] the deposition of the Hapsburgs; but still held himself in suspense as to the future of the constitution. By his influence instructions were sent to his representative in England, which were equivalent to soliciting a dynasty from the British government. Meanwhile Szemer��, his Home Secretary, took on himself to avow in the Diet that the government was REPUBLICAN, and no voice of protest was raised in either house. Indeed, Mr. Vucovics, who was Minister of Justice under Kossuth, states (see Appendix I.) that the government and both houses responded unanimously to the republican avowal, and that the government removed the symbol of the Crown from the public arms and seal. The press of all shades assented. After this, it was clear (I presume) to Kossuth, or at least it soon became so, that all sympathy with royal power was gone out of the nation's heart. Hungarians may settle that amongst themselves: but as for Englishmen,--when for seven or eight months together the English ministry and English peerage would not stir, or speak, or whisper, to save constitutional royalty and ancient peerage for Hungary and for Europe while it was yet possible; with what face, with what decency, can Englishmen censure Kossuth for despairing of a cause, which was abandoned to ruin by ourselves, the greatest power interested to maintain it,--which the monarchs have waded through blood and perjury to destroy,-and which the millions of Hungary will not (in his belief) peril life and fortune to restore?
[Footnote *: How unanimous was the whole country, is clear by the facts stated. How spontaneous was the movement, and free from all government intrigue, see in Appendix I. This is entirely confirmed by our envoy, Mr. Blackwell: Blue Book, March--Ap. 1848.]
2. The ministry of Louis Bathyanyi and Kossuth have been attacked on opposite grounds,--because they did, and because they did not, attempt to subdue the Italians by force of arms. The facts are rather complicated, but deserve here to be stated concisely.
When the ministry was appointed, there were already Hungarians in Italy with Radetzki, and Austrian soldiers in Hungary. The Viennese ministry promised to exchange them, as fast as could be done without encountering great expense or dislocating the regiments and making them inefficient. With this promise the Hungarian ministry was forced to content itself at the time. At a later period, when it discovered that the Austrian commanders in Hungary had secret orders not to fight against the Serbian marauders, and that the Austrian troops could not be trusted, the Hungarian ministry desired to get back their men from Italy for their own defence; which desire proved ineffectual, yet has been severely blamed by some of our monarchists. But meanwhile the Viennese ministry, as early as June, 1848, endeavoured to buy of the Hungarian ministry an increased grant of troops against Italy, by conceding a most energetic "King's Speech" against the Serbs, with which the Archduke Palatine was to open, and did open, the Diet on July 2d. A part of this speech is quoted in Appendix II., and indeed it is a loathsome exhibition of Austrian treachery. The Hungarian ministry were pressed by the arguments, that since Austria was attacked in Italy by the King of Sardinia, the war was not merely against the Lombards; and that the Pragmatic Sanction bound Hungary to defend the empire if assailed from without. This led them to acknowledge the principle, that they were bound to assist, if able; but they replied that Hungary itself must first be secured against marauders, and no troops could be spared until the Serbs were subdued. At the same time orders were sent to Radetzki from Vienna to offer independence to the Lombards, and constitutional nationality under the Austrian crown to the Venetians: hence the Hungarian ministry for a time fancied that they would not be fighting against the Italians, as they expected the terms to be accepted by them. When it was farther represented that the Italians had rejected them,--(for Radetzki, acting probably by secret orders, suppressed the despatches, and never offered independence to Lombardy, though the Austrian ministers made diplomatic capital of their liberality,)--then the Hungarian ministry began to think the Italians unreasonable; yet they did not go