Philosophy and Religion | Page 3

. . . . . . . 8
3. This is the great discovery of Berkeley, though he did not adequately
distinguish between sensations and intellectual
relations, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4. But Matter certainly does not exist merely for our transitory and
incomplete knowledge: if it cannot exist apart from Mind, there must
be a universal Mind in which and for which all things exist, i.e.
God, . . . . . . . 16
5. But Theism is possible without Idealism. The impossibility of
Materialism has generally been recognized (e.g. by Spinoza, Spencer,
Haeckel). If the ultimate Reality is not Matter, it must be utterly unlike
anything we know, or be Mind. The latter view more
probable, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6. It is more reasonable to explain the lower by the higher than vice

versâ, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
LECTURE II
THE UNIVERSAL CAUSE, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1. We have been led by the idealistic argument to recognize the
necessity of a Mind which thinks the world. Insufficiency of this view.
{xiii}
2. In our experiences of external Nature we meet with nothing but
succession, never with Causality. The Uniformity of Nature is a
postulate of Physical Science, not a necessity of thought. The idea of
Causality derived from our consciousness of Volition.
Causality=Activity, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3. If events must have a cause, and we know of no cause but Will, it is
reasonable to infer that the events which we do not cause must be
caused by some other Will; and the systematic unity of Nature implies
that this cause must be One Will, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4. Moreover, the analogy of the human mind suggests the probability
that, if God is Mind, there must be in Him, as in us, the three activities
of Thought, Feeling, and Will, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5. The above line of argument can be used by the Realist who believes
matter to be a thing-in-itself; but it fits in much better with the
Idealistic view of the relations between mind and matter, and with the
tendency of modern physics to resolve matter into Force, . 48
6. Testimony of Spencer and Kant to the theory that the Ultimate
Reality is Will, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
7. Is God a Person? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
LECTURE III
GOD AND THE MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

1. The empirical study of Nature ('red in tooth and claw') can tell us of
purpose, not what the purpose is. The only source of knowledge of the
character of God is to be found in the moral Consciousness.
2. Our moral judgements are as valid as other judgements (e.g.
mathematical axioms), and equally reveal the thought of
God, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3. This does not imply that the moral consciousness is not gradually
evolved, or that each individual's conscience is infallible, or that our
moral judgements in detail are as certain as mathematical judgements,
or that the detailed rules of human conduct are applicable to God, . . 63
{xiv}
4. Corollaries:
(a) Belief in the objectivity of our moral judgements logically implies
belief in God, . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (b) If God aims at an end not fully
realized here, we have a ground for postulating Immortality, . . . . . . 77
(c) Evil must be a necessary means to greater good, . . 79
5. In what sense this 'limits God.' Omnipotence=ability to do all things
which are in their own nature possible, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
LECTURE IV
DIFFICULTIES AND OBJECTIONS, . . . . . . . . . . . .