Philosophy and Religion | Page 2

and also in the Indo-European families which gave to it
the quality of the life to which they have attained. But Theology has to
do with more than sacred literature; it has also to do with the thoughts
and life its history occasioned. Therefore the Church has to be studied
and presented as an institution which God founded and man
administers. But it is possible to know this Church only through the
thoughts it thinks, the doctrines it holds, the characters and the persons
it forms, the people who are its saints and embody its ideals of sanctity,
the acts it does, which are its sacraments, and the laws it follows and
enforces, which are its polity, and the young it educates and the nations
it directs and controls. These are the points to be presented in the
volumes which follow, which are all to be occupied with theology or
the knowledge of God and His ways.
A. M. F. 'O.'

{ix}
PREFACE
These Lectures were delivered in Cambridge during the Lent Term of
last year, on the invitation of a Committee presided over by the Master
of Magdalene, before an audience of from three hundred to four
hundred University men, chiefly Under-graduates. They were not then,
and they are not now, intended for philosophers or even for beginners
in the systematic study of philosophy, but as aids to educated men
desirous of thinking out for themselves a reasonable basis for personal
Religion.
The Lectures--especially the first three--deal with questions on which I
have already written. I am indebted to the Publisher of Contentio
Veritatis and the other contributors to that volume for raising no
objection to my publishing Lectures which might possibly be regarded
as in part a condensation, in part an expansion of my Essay on 'The

ultimate basis of Theism.' I have dealt more systematically with many
of the problems here discussed in an Essay upon 'Personality in God
and Man' contributed to Personal Idealism (edited by Henry {x} Sturt)
and in my 'Theory of Good and Evil.' Some of the doctrinal questions
touched on in Lecture VI. have been more fully dealt with in my
volume of University Sermons, Doctrine and Development.
Questions which were asked at the time and communications which
have since reached me have made me feel, more even than I did when I
was writing the Lectures, how inadequate is the treatment here given to
many great problems. On some matters much fuller explanation and
discussion will naturally be required to convince persons previously
unfamiliar with Metaphysic: on others it is the more advanced student
of Philosophy who will complain that I have only touched upon the
fringe of a vast subject. But I have felt that I could not seriously expand
any part of the Lectures without changing the whole character of the
book, and I have been compelled in general to meet the demand for
further explanation only by the above general reference to my other
books, by the addition of a few notes, and by appending to each chapter
some suggestions for more extended reading. These might of course
have been indefinitely enlarged, but a long list of books is apt to defeat
its own purpose: people with a limited time at their disposal want to
know which book to make a beginning upon.
The Lectures are therefore published for the most {xi} part just as they
were delivered, in the hope that they may suggest lines of thought
which may be intellectually and practically useful. I trust that any
philosopher who may wish to take serious notice of my
views--especially the metaphysical views expressed in the first few
chapters--will be good enough to remember that the expression of them
is avowedly incomplete and elementary, and cannot fairly be criticized
in much detail without reference to my other writings.
I am much indebted for several useful suggestions and for valuable
assistance in revising the proofs to one of the hearers of the Lectures,
Mr. A. G. Widgery, Scholar of St. Catherine's College, Cambridge,
now Lecturer in University College, Bristol.

H. RASHDALL.
NEW COLLEGE, OXFORD, Jan. 6, 1909.

{xii}
CONTENTS
LECTURE I
MIND AND MATTER, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1. Is Materialism possible? There is no immediate knowledge of Matter;
what we know is always Self + Matter. The idea of a Matter which can
exist by itself is an inference: is it a reasonable one?
2. No. For all that we know about Matter implies Mind. This is obvious
as to secondary qualities (colour, sound, etc.); but it is no less true of
primary qualities (solidity, magnitude, etc.). Relations, no less than
sensations, imply Mind, . . . .