Moral Science | Page 8

it squares, to a very great extent, with
Political Authority. The points where the two coincide, and those where
they do not coincide, may be briefly stated:--
(1) All the most essential parts of Morality are adopted and carried out
by the Law of the Land. The rules for protecting person and property,
for fulfilling contracts, for performing reciprocal duties, are rules or
laws of the State; and are enforced by the State, through its own
machinery. The penalties inflicted by public authority constitute what is
called the Political Sanction; they are the most severe, and the most
strictly and dispassionately administered, of all penalties.
(2) There are certain Moral duties enforced, not by public and official
authority, but by the members of the community in their private
capacity. These are sometimes called the Laws of Honour, because they
are punished by withdrawing from the violator the honour or esteem of
his fellow-citizens. Courage, Prudence as regards self, Chastity,
Orthodoxy of opinion, a certain conformity in Tastes and Usages,--are
all prescribed by the mass of each community, to a greater or less
extent, and are insisted on under penalty of social disgrace and
excommunication. This is the Social or the Popular Sanction. The
department so marked out, being distinct from the Political sphere, is
called, by Austin, Positive Morality, or Morality proper.
Public opinion also chimes in with the Law, and adds its own sanction

to the legal penalties for offences: unless the law happens to be in
conflict with the popular sentiment. Criminals, condemned by the law,
are additionally punished by social disgrace.
(3) The Law of the Land contains many enactments, besides the Moral
Code and the machinery for executing it. The Province of government
passes beyond the properly protective function, and includes many
institutions of public convenience, which are not identified with right
and wrong. The defence from external enemies; the erection of works
of public utility; the promotion of social improvements,--are all within
the domain of the public authority.[1]
II.--The second class of Rules are supported, not by penalties, but by
Rewards. Society, instead of punishing men for not being charitable or
benevolent, praises and otherwise rewards them, when they are so.
Hence, although Morality inculcates benevolence, this is not a Law
proper, it is not obligatory, authoritative, or binding; it is purely
voluntary, and is termed merit, virtuous and noble conduct.
In this department, the members of the community, in their unofficial
capacity, are the chief agents and administrators. The Law of the Land
occupies itself with the enforcement of its own obligatory rules, having
at its command a perfect machinery of punishment. Private individuals
administer praise, honour, esteem, approbation, and reward. In a few
instances, the Government dispenses rewards, as in the bestowal of
office, rank, titles, and pensions, but this function is exceptional and
limited.
The conduct rewarded by Society is chiefly resolvable into Beneficence.
Whoever is moved to incur sacrifices, or to go through labours, for the
good of others, is the object, not merely of gratitude from the persons
benefited, but of approbation from society at large.
Any remarkable strictness or fidelity in the discharge of duties properly
so called, receives general esteem. Even in matters merely ceremonial,
if importance be attached to them, sedulous and exact compliance,
being the distinction of the few, will earn the approbation of the
many.[2]

5. The Ethical End, or Morality, as it has been, is founded partly on
Well-being, or Utility: and partly on Sentiment.
The portions of Morality, having in view the prevention of human
misery and the promotion of human happiness, are known and obvious.
They are not the whole of Morality as it has been.
Sentiment, caprice, arbitrary liking or disliking, are names for states of
feeling that do not necessarily arise from their objects, but may be
joined or disjoined by education, custom, or the power of the will. The
revulsion of mind, on the part of the Jews, against eating the pig, and
on our own part, as regards horse flesh, is not a primitive or natural
sensibility, like the pain of hunger, or of cold, or of a musical discord;
it is purely artificial; custom has made it, and could unmake it. The
feeling of fatigue from overwork is natural; the repugnance of caste to
manual labour is factitious. The dignity attached to the military
profession, and the indignity of the office of public executioner, are
capricious, arbitrary, and sentimental. Our prospective regard to the
comforts of our declining years points to a real interest; our feelings as
to the disposal of the body after death are purely factitious and
sentimental. Such feelings are of the things in our own power; and the
grand mistake of the Stoics was their viewing all good and evil
whatever in the same light.