Moral Science | Page 6

questions of pure PSYCHOLOGY.
1. The Psychological nature of Conscience, the Moral Sense, or by
whatever name we designate the faculty of distinguishing right and
wrong, together with the motive power to follow the one and eschew
the other. That such a faculty exists is admitted. The question is, what
is its place and origin in the mind?
On the one side, Conscience is held to be a unique and ultimate power
of the mind, like the feeling of Resistance, the sense of Taste, or the
consciousness of Agreement. On the other side, Conscience is viewed
as a growth or derivation from other recognized properties of the mind.
The Theory of the Standard (4) called the doctrine of the Moral Sense,
proceeds upon the first view; on that theory, the Standard and the
Faculty make properly but one question. All other theories are more or
less compatible with the composite or derivative nature of Conscience;
the supporters of Utility, in particular, adopt this alternative.
2. A second Psychological question, regarded by many (notably by
Kant) as vitally implicated in Moral Obligation, is the Freedom of the
Will. The history of opinion on this subject has been in great part
already given.
3. Thirdly, It has been debated, on Psychological grounds, whether our
Benevolent actions (which all admit) are ultimately modes of
self-regard, or whether there be, in the human mind, a source of purely
Disinterested conduct. The first view, or the reference of benevolence
to Self, admits of degrees and varieties of statement.
(1) It may be held that in performing good actions, we expect and
obtain an immediate reward fully equivalent to the sacrifice made.

Occasionally we are rewarded in kind; but the reward most usually
forthcoming (according to Mandeville), is praise or flattery, to which
the human mind is acutely sensitive.
(2) Our constitution may be such that we are pained by the sight of an
object in distress, and give assistance, to relieve ourselves of the pain.
This was the view of Hobbes; and it is also admitted by Mandeville as a
secondary motive.
(3) We may be so formed as to derive enjoyment from the performance
of acts of kindness, in the same immediate way that we are gratified by
warmth, flowers, or music; we should thus be moved to benevolence by
an intrinsic pleasure, and not by extraneous consequences.
Bentham speaks of the pleasures and the pains of Benevolence,
meaning that we derive pleasure from causing pleasure to others, and
pain from the sight of pain in others.
(4) It may be affirmed that, although we have not by nature any purely
disinterested impulses, these are generated in us by associations and
habits, in a manner similar to the conversion of means into final ends,
as in the case of money. This is the view propounded by James Mill,
and by Mackintosh.
Allowance being made for a certain amount of fact in these various
modes of connecting Benevolence with self, it is still maintained in the
present work, as by Butler, Hume, Adam Smith, and others, that human
beings are (although very unequally) endowed with a prompting to
relieve the pains and add to the pleasures of others, irrespective of all
self-regarding considerations; and that such prompting is not a product
of associations with self.
In the ancient world, purely disinterested conduct was abundantly
manifested in practice, although not made prominent in Ethical Theory.
The enumeration of the Cardinal Virtues does not expressly contain
Benevolence; but under Courage, Self-sacrifice was implied. Patriotic
Self-devotion, Love, and Friendship were virtues highly cultivated. In
Cicero, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius, there is a recognition of general

Benevolence.
The two heads now sketched--The Standard and the Psychology of our
Moral nature--almost entirely exhaust modern Ethics. Smith, Stewart,
and Mackintosh agree in laying down as the points in dispute these
two:--First, What does virtue consist in? Secondly, What is the power
or faculty of the mind that discovers and enforces it?
These two positions, however, are inadequate as regards Ancient Ethics.
For remedying the deficiency, and for bringing to light matters
necessary to the completeness of an Ethical survey, we add the
following heads:--
III. The Theory of what constitutes the Supreme END of Life, the
BONUM or the SUMMUM BONUM. The question as to the highest
End has divided the Ethical Schools, both ancient and modern. It was
the point at issue between the Stoics and the Epicureans. That
Happiness is not the highest end has been averred, in modern times, by
Butler and others: the opposite position is held by the supporters of
Utility. What may be called the severe and ascetic systems
(theoretically) refuse to sanction any pursuit of happiness or pleasure,
except through virtue, or duty to others. The view practically proceeded
upon, now and in most ages, is