Memoirs of General Sherman, vol 2 | Page 4

General J. L. Donaldson,
and the chief commissary, General Amos Beckwith, for conference. I
assumed the strength of the army to move from Chattanooga into
Georgia at one hundred thousand men, and the number of animals to be
fed, both for cavalry and draught, at thirty-five thousand; then,
allowing for occasional wrecks of trains, which were very common,
and for the interruption of the road itself by guerrillas and regular raids,
we estimated it would require one hundred and thirty cars, of ten tons
each, to reach Chattanooga daily, to be reasonably certain of an
adequate supply. Even with this calculation, we could not afford to
bring forward hay for the horses and mules, nor more than five pounds
of oats or corn per day for each animal. I was willing to risk the
question of forage in part, because I expected to find wheat and corn

fields, and a good deal of grass, as we advanced into Georgia at that
season of the year. The problem then was to deliver at Chattanooga and
beyond one hundred and thirty car-loads daily, leaving the beef-cattle
to be driven on the hoof, and all the troops in excess of the usual
train-guards to march by the ordinary roads. Colonel Anderson
promptly explained that he did not possess cars or locomotives enough
to do this work. I then instructed and authorized him to hold on to all
trains that arrived at Nashville from Louisville, and to allow none to go
back until he had secured enough to fill the requirements of our
problem. At the time he only had about sixty serviceable locomotives,
and about six hundred cars of all kinds, and he represented that to
provide for all contingencies he must have at least one hundred
locomotives and one thousand cars. As soon as Mr. Guthrie, the
President of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, detected that we were
holding on to all his locomotives and cars, he wrote me, earnestly
remonstrating against it, saying that he would not be able with
diminished stock to bring forward the necessary stores from Louisville
to Nashville. I wrote to him, frankly telling him exactly how we were
placed, appealed to his patriotism to stand by us, and advised him in
like manner to hold on to all trains coming into Jeffersonville, Indiana.
He and General Robert Allen, then quartermaster-general at Louisville,
arranged a ferry-boat so as to transfer the trains over the Ohio River
from Jeffersonville, and in a short time we had cars and locomotives
from almost every road at the North; months afterward I was amused to
see, away down in Georgia, cars marked "Pittsburg & Fort Wayne,"
"Delaware & Lackawanna," "Baltimore & Ohio," and indeed with the
names of almost every railroad north of the Ohio River. How these
railroad companies ever recovered their property, or settled their
transportation accounts, I have never heard, but to this fact, as much as
to any other single fact, I attribute the perfect success which afterward
attended our campaigns; and I have always felt grateful to Mr. Guthrie,
of Louisville, who had sense enough and patriotism enough to
subordinate the interests of his railroad company to the cause of his
country.
About this time, viz., the early part of April, I was much disturbed by a
bold raid made by the rebel General Forrest up between the Mississippi
and Tennessee Rivers. He reached the Ohio River at Paducah, but was

handsomely repulsed by Colonel Hicks. He then swung down toward
Memphis, assaulted and carried Fort Pillow, massacring a part of its
garrison, composed wholly of negro troops. At first I discredited the
story of the massacre, because, in preparing for the Meridian campaign,
I had ordered Fort Pillow to be evacuated, but it transpired afterward
that General Hurlbut had retained a small garrison at Fort Pillow to
encourage the enlistment of the blacks as soldiers, which was a favorite
political policy at that day. The massacre at Fort Pillow occurred April
12, 1864, and has been the subject of congressional inquiry. No doubt
Forrest's men acted like a set of barbarians, shooting down the helpless
negro garrison after the fort was in their possession; but I am told that
Forrest personally disclaims any active participation in the assault, and
that he stopped the firing as soon as he could. I also take it for granted
that Forrest did not lead the assault in person, and consequently that he
was to the rear, out of sight if not of hearing at the time, and I was told
by hundreds of our men, who were at various times prisoners in
Forrest's possession, that he was usually very kind to them. He had a
desperate set of fellows under him, and at that very time there is no
doubt the