Memoirs of General Sherman, vol 2 | Page 3

to Nashville by rail, and by way of the
Cumberland River, had to be guarded. Chattanooga (our starting-point)
was one hundred and thirty-six miles in front of Nashville, and every
foot of the way, especially the many bridges, trestles, and culverts, had
to be strongly guarded against the acts of a local hostile population and
of the enemy's cavalry. Then, of course, as we advanced into Georgia,
it was manifest that we should have to repair the railroad, use it, and
guard it like- wise: General Thomas's army was much the largest of the

three, was best provided, and contained the best corps of engineers,
railroad managers, and repair parties, as well as the best body of spies
and provost-marshals. On him we were therefore compelled in a great
measure to rely for these most useful branches of service. He had so
long exercised absolute command and control over the railroads in his
department, that the other armies were jealous, and these thought the
Army of the Cumberland got the lion's share of the supplies and other
advantages of the railroads. I found a good deal of feeling in the Army
of the Tennessee on this score, and therefore took supreme control of
the roads myself, placed all the army commanders on an equal footing,
and gave to each the same control, so far as orders of transportation for
men and stores were concerned. Thomas's spies brought him frequent
and accurate reports of Jos. E. Johnston's army at Dalton, giving its
strength anywhere between forty and fifty thousand men, and these
were being reenforced by troops from Mississippi, and by the Georgia
militia, under General G. W. Smith. General Johnston seemed to be
acting purely on the defensive, so that we had time and leisure to take
all our measures deliberately and fully. I fixed the date of May 1st,
when all things should be in readiness for the grand forward movement,
and then returned to Nashville; General Schofield going back to
Knoxville, and McPherson to Huntsville, Thomas remaining at
Chattanooga.
On the 2d of April, at Nashville, I wrote to General Grant, then at
Washington, reporting to him the results of my visit to the several
armies, and asked his consent to the several changes proposed, which
was promptly given by telegraph. I then addressed myself specially to
the troublesome question of transportation and supplies. I found the
capacity of the railroads from Nashville forward to Decatur, and to
Chattanooga, so small, especially in the number of locomotives and
care, that it was clear that they were barely able to supply the daily
wants of the armies then dependent on them, with no power of
accumulating a surplus in advance. The cars were daily loaded down
with men returning from furlough, with cattle, horses, etc.; and, by
reason of the previous desolation of the country between Chattanooga
and Knoxville, General Thomas had authorized the issue of provisions
to the suffering inhabitants.
We could not attempt an advance into Georgia without food,

ammunition, etc.; and ordinary prudence dictated that we should have
an accumulation at the front, in case of interruption to the railway by
the act of the enemy, or by common accident. Accordingly, on the 6th
of April, I issued a general order, limiting the use of the railroad-cars to
transporting only the essential articles of food, ammunition, and
supplies for the army proper, forbidding any further issues to citizens,
and cutting off all civil traffic; requiring the commanders of posts
within thirty miles of Nashville to haul out their own stores in wagons;
requiring all troops destined for the front to march, and all beef- cattle
to be driven on their own legs. This was a great help, but of course it
naturally raised a howl. Some of the poor Union people of East
Tennessee appealed to President Lincoln, whose kind heart responded
promptly to their request. He telegraphed me to know if I could not
modify or repeal my orders; but I answered him that a great campaign
was impending, on which the fate of the nation hung; that our railroads
had but a limited capacity, and could not provide for the necessities of
the army and of the people too; that one or the other must quit, and we
could not until the army of Jos. Johnston was conquered, etc., etc. Mr.
Lincoln seemed to acquiesce, and I advised the people to obtain and
drive out cattle from Kentucky, and to haul out their supplies by the
wagon- road from the same quarter, by way of Cumberland Gap. By
these changes we nearly or quite doubled our daily accumulation of
stores at the front, and yet even this was not found enough.
I accordingly called together in Nashville the master of transportation,
Colonel Anderson, the chief quartermaster,