Lectures on Land Warfare | Page 7

me to assault the North Pole! But, if he had ordered, we should
have done it!"
THE NECESSITY FOR STUDY.--It is not pretended by any sane
writer that study alone will make a perfect officer, for it is universally
recognised that no amount of theoretical training can supply the
knowledge gained by direct and immediate association with troops in
the field; nor is it claimed that study will make a dull man brilliant, or
confer resolution and rapid decision on one who is timid and irresolute
by nature. But "the quick, {5} the resolute, the daring, deciding and
acting rapidly, as is their nature, will be all the more likely to decide
and act correctly in proportion as they have studied the art they are
called upon to practise" ("The Science of War"). Theory, applied to the
profession of arms, is to some a word of most obnoxious sound, but it
is obnoxious only to those who refuse to listen to the advice, or to take
warning from the practice, of Napoleon, of Wellington, of Foch, and of
many of the most famous generals of history. "A man thoroughly
penetrated with the spirit of Napoleon's warfare would hardly fail in all
circumstances to make his enemy's communications his first objective;
and if Wellington's tactical methods had become a second nature to him
it would be strange indeed if he were seduced into delivering a purely
frontal attack. . . . The same tactical principles regulate the combat of a
large force and a small, and it is the thorough grasp of the principles,
combined with courage and coolness, that makes a capable leader,
whether of a platoon or an army corps" ("The Science of War").

{6}
STRATEGY AND TACTICS

DEFINITIONS.--Strategy and Tactics have often been treated by
non-military writers as if they were independent branches of the
soldier's profession, but while they may indeed be separately defined it
will be found in practice that they cannot be separately considered. The
theatre of operations is the kingdom of Strategy, the province of Tactics
is the field of battle, but when the battlefield is reached it so far
transcends in importance every other point in the theatre of operations
that no tactical end is worth aiming at in preference to striking with all
available strength at the field force of the enemy, and this, it will be
seen, is the goal of all strategical combinations. "Strategy must ever be
striving for Tactical success; Tactics must ever keep in mind the
Strategical situation and must constantly aim at creating fresh
Strategical opportunities. Tactics without Strategy resembles a man
without legs; Strategy without Tactics is like a man without arms"
(General Sir E. B. Hamley). "To seek out the enemy's armies--the
centre of the adversary's power--in order to beat and destroy them; to
adopt, with this sole end in view, the direction and tactics which will
lead to it in the quickest and safest way: such is the whole mental
attitude of modern war. No Strategy can henceforth prevail over that
which aims at ensuring Tactical results, victory by fighting" (Marshal
Foch).
Local successes on the field of battle often have effects that are felt
throughout the theatre of operations. Lord Roberts's advance on
Pretoria relieved the pressure on Kimberley in the west and on
Ladysmith in the east, and these centres are upwards of 300 miles apart.
The {7} First Battle of the Somme (July 1, 1916) not only relieved the
pressure on Verdun but held in position large enemy forces which
would otherwise have been employed against our Allies in the East.
General Byng's surprise attack at Cambrai (November 20, 1917) was
followed by a determined counter-attack by the Germans on November
30, which appeared to nullify the results achieved from November 20
to 25; but "there is evidence that German divisions intended for the
Italian theatre were diverted to the Cambrai front, and it is probable that
the further concentration of German forces against Italy was suspended
for at least two weeks at a most critical period, when our Allies were
making their first stand on the Piave Line" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).

A tactical defeat may sometimes be risked to serve a strategic end. In
June, 1864, General Hunter was operating with a Federal army in the
Shenandoah Valley, and owing to shortage of supplies was forced to
fall back. In so doing he uncovered the National Capital, and General
Early was sent by the Confederate Commander-in-Chief to capture
Washington. General Grant took immediate steps to protect the capital
by the dispatch of troops, and to further this end, General Lew
Wallace,[1] on his own initiative, confronted Early's corps at the
Monocacy on July 8, 1864. He met the enemy and was defeated, but he
delayed Early's corps until the troops